نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 0.8.12
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.9.0
- نسخههای متأثر
- <0.9.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.9.0
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Mass Assignment via Pydantic extra='allow' Allows Creating Folders in Other Users' Accounts
Affected Component
Folder creation endpoint and form model:
backend/open_webui/models/folders.py(lines 72-77,FolderFormwithextra='allow')backend/open_webui/models/folders.py(lines 95-106,insert_new_folderdict construction)backend/open_webui/routers/folders.py(line 119,create_folderendpoint)
Affected Versions
Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions since FolderForm adopted extra='allow'.
Description
FolderForm uses model_config = ConfigDict(extra='allow'), which permits arbitrary fields to pass through Pydantic validation and be included in model_dump(exclude_unset=True). In insert_new_folder, the server-assigned user_id is placed at the start of the dict and then overwritten by the spread of form data:
# models/folders.py:95-106
folder = FolderModel(
**{
'id': id, # server
'user_id': user_id, # server — overwritten below
**(form_data.model_dump(exclude_unset=True) or {}), # user-controlled (extra='allow')
'parent_id': parent_id,
'created_at': int(time.time()),
'updated_at': int(time.time()),
}
)
Because FolderModel declares user_id: str as a real field (not just a form extra), any attacker-supplied user_id in the POST body is accepted by the model and persisted on the Folder row.
Attack Scenario
Attacker discovers a victim's user ID. User UUIDs commonly leak via the user search endpoint (
GET /api/v1/users/search, intentionally accessible to verified users for sharing UI), shared chat metadata, or channel member lists.Attacker sends:
POST /api/v1/folders/ { "name": "Important: Click here", "user_id": "<victim_user_id>", "meta": {"icon": "warning"}, "data": {...} }Pydantic accepts the extra
user_idfield (allowed byextra='allow').insert_new_folderspreads the form data over the server-set'user_id': user_id, overwriting it with the attacker's value.The
Folderrow is persisted withuser_id = <victim_user_id>.The victim sees the attacker-planted folder in their UI on next load because
GET /api/v1/folders/filters by the viewer's ownuser_id.
The attacker can repeat this to plant multiple folders, use crafted name values for phishing ("Click here to recover account" / "Security alert"), and abuse the meta and data fields to add visual elements that further mimic legitimate content.
Impact
Unauthorized write into victim's folder tree
Phishing surface: attacker-controlled
name,meta, anddatarender in the victim's UI in a trusted contextDoS / spam: attacker can flood a victim with arbitrary folders; victim must manually delete each one
Attacker cannot read the folder back — all read paths filter by the caller's own
user_id— so confidentiality is preserved, but integrity and trust are compromised
Preconditions
Attacker must have an authenticated account with
features.folderspermission (default for all users)Attacker must know or guess the victim's user UUID (obtainable through various non-sensitive endpoints)
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- Classic298

