نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 0.8.12
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.9.0
- نسخههای متأثر
- <0.9.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.9.0
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Channel Access Grants Bypass filter_allowed_access_grants
Affected Component
Channel creation and update endpoints:
backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py(lines 291-340,create_new_channel)backend/open_webui/routers/channels.py(lines 617-638,update_channel_by_id)backend/open_webui/models/channels.py(lines 825-826,set_access_grantscall without filtering)
Affected Versions
Current main branch (commit 6fdd19bf1) and likely all versions supporting user-created group channels with access grants.
Description
All resource routers in Open WebUI (knowledge, models, notes, prompts, tools, skills) call filter_allowed_access_grants() before persisting access grants. This function strips principal_id: "*" wildcard grants from users who lack the relevant sharing.public_* permission, and strips individual user grants from users who lack access_grants.allow_users permission.
The channel router does not call filter_allowed_access_grants on either create or update paths. A non-admin user who can create group channels (or who owns a channel) can submit arbitrary access grants — including public wildcard grants — and those grants are stored verbatim, bypassing the admin's permission framework.
# channels.py — access_grants from form data flow directly into persistence
# No call to filter_allowed_access_grants() anywhere in these paths.
# Compare with knowledge.py / models.py / notes.py / prompts.py / tools.py / skills.py,
# all of which do:
# form_data.access_grants = filter_allowed_access_grants(user, form_data.access_grants)
# before creating or updating.
Attack Scenario
Admin configures permissions so that regular users do NOT have
sharing.public_channels— public sharing of channels is intended to be admin-only.Attacker (a regular user) creates or owns a group channel.
Attacker sends:
POST /api/v1/channels/ { "name": "public-channel", "type": "group", "access_control": { "access_grants": [ {"principal_type": "user", "principal_id": "*", "permission": "read"} ] } }set_access_grantsis called directly withoutfilter_allowed_access_grants— the wildcard grant is persisted.The channel becomes publicly readable to every user on the instance, despite the admin's policy prohibiting public channels for regular users.
The same attack works via POST /api/v1/channels/{id}/update for any channel the attacker owns.
Impact
Regular users can bypass the
sharing.public_channelspermission and make channels publicly accessibleRegular users can bypass
access_grants.allow_usersto grant individual-user access in environments where only group-based sharing is intendedAdmin's permission framework for channels is silently ineffective
Creates an inconsistency with every other resource type in the codebase, making the security posture harder to reason about
Preconditions
Attacker must have an account with the ability to create group channels (default user capability), or ownership of an existing channel
Admin must have configured restrictive sharing permissions for regular users (otherwise there's no policy to bypass)
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- Classic298

