نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- <1.7.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.7.0
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 1.7.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.7.0
شرح آسیبپذیری
Impact
During recovery, a Coordinator only verifies that a given recovery key decrypts the sealed state, not if this key was provided by a party with access to one of the recovery keys defined in the manifest. This allows an attacker to manually craft a sealed state using their own recovery keys, and a manifest that does not match the rest of the state.
If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's Coordinator, a remote party is susceptible to impersonation if they verify the Coordinator without comparing the root certificate of the Coordinator against a trusted reference.
Under these circumstances, an attacker can trick a remote party into trusting the malicious Coordinator by presenting a manifest that does not match the actual state of the deployment.
This issue does not affect the following:
secrets and state of the legitimate Coordinator instances
integrity of workloads
certificates chaining back to the legitimate Coordinator root certificate
Patches
The issue has been patched in v1.7.0.
Workarounds
Connections that purely authenticate based on a known Coordinator's root certificate, e.g. the one retrieved when using the marblerun manifest set CLI command, are not affected.
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-w7wm-2425-7p2h
- https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun
- https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/commit/e4864f9f1d0f12a4a7d28514da43bcc75603a5b5
- https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/releases/tag/v1.7.0
- https://github.com/edgelesssys/marblerun/security/advisories/GHSA-w7wm-2425-7p2h
- https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2025-3450

