همهٔ گزارش‌ها
زیاد

Contrast's unauthenticated recovery allows Coordinator impersonation

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

بازه‌ها نیاز به بررسی دارند.

نسخه‌های متأثر
<= 1.4.0
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
1.4.1
نسخه‌های متأثر
<1.4.1
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
1.4.1

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2025-71426

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.14%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۷

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Impact

Recovering coordinators do not verify the seed provided by the recovering party. This allows an attacker to set up a coordinator with a manifest that passes validation, but with a secret seed controlled by the attacker.

If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's coordinator, a workload owner is susceptible to impersonation if either

  • they set a new manifest and don't compare the root CA cert with the existing one (this is the default of the contrast CLI) or

  • they verify the coordinator and don't compare the root CA cert with a trusted reference.

Under these circumstances, the attacker can:

  • Issue certificates that chain back to the attacker coordinator's root CA.

  • Recover arbitrary workload secrets of workloads deployed after the attack.

This issue does not affect the following:

  • secrets of the legitimate coordinator (seed, workload secrets, CA)

  • integrity of workloads, even when used with the rogue coordinator

  • certificates chaining back to the mesh CA

Patches

This issue is patched in Contrast v1.4.1.

Workarounds

The issue can be avoided by verifying the coordinator root CA cert against expectations.

  • At the first set call, keep a copy of the CA cert returned by the coordinator.

  • After subsequent set or verify calls, compare the returned CA cert with the backup copy. If it matches bit-for-bit, the coordinator is legitimate.

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • 3u13r
  • burgerdev
  • katexochen