نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 1.4.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.4.1
- نسخههای متأثر
- <1.4.1
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.4.1
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Impact
Recovering coordinators do not verify the seed provided by the recovering party. This allows an attacker to set up a coordinator with a manifest that passes validation, but with a secret seed controlled by the attacker.
If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's coordinator, a workload owner is susceptible to impersonation if either
they
seta new manifest and don't compare the root CA cert with the existing one (this is the default of thecontrastCLI) orthey
verifythe coordinator and don't compare the root CA cert with a trusted reference.
Under these circumstances, the attacker can:
Issue certificates that chain back to the attacker coordinator's root CA.
Recover arbitrary workload secrets of workloads deployed after the attack.
This issue does not affect the following:
secrets of the legitimate coordinator (seed, workload secrets, CA)
integrity of workloads, even when used with the rogue coordinator
certificates chaining back to the mesh CA
Patches
This issue is patched in Contrast v1.4.1.
Workarounds
The issue can be avoided by verifying the coordinator root CA cert against expectations.
At the first
setcall, keep a copy of the CA cert returned by the coordinator.After subsequent
setorverifycalls, compare the returned CA cert with the backup copy. If it matches bit-for-bit, the coordinator is legitimate.
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- 3u13r
- burgerdev
- katexochen

