نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- >=1.2.6 <1.28.2
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.28.2
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 0.0.0-20260110031614
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.0.0-20260110031614
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 1.2.6, < 1.28.2
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.28.2
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary The Mailpit WebSocket server is configured to accept connections from any origin. This lack of Origin header validation introduces a Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) vulnerability.
An attacker can host a malicious website that, when visited by a developer running Mailpit locally, establishes a WebSocket connection to the victim's Mailpit instance (default ws://localhost:8025). This allows the attacker to intercept sensitive data such as email contents, headers, and server statistics in real-time.
Vulnerable Code The vulnerability exists in server/websockets/client.go where the CheckOrigin function is explicitly set to return true for all requests, bypassing standard Same-Origin Policy (SOP) protections provided by the gorilla/websocket library.
Impact This vulnerability impacts the Confidentiality of the data stored in or processed by Mailpit. Although Mailpit is often used as a local development tool, this vulnerability allows remote exploitation via a web browser.
Scenario: A developer has Mailpit running at localhost:8025.
Trigger: The developer visits a malicious website (or a compromised legitimate site) in the same browser.
Exploitation: The malicious site's JavaScript initiates a WebSocket connection to ws://localhost:8025/api/events. Since the origin check is disabled, the browser allows this cross-origin connection.
Data Leak: The attacker receives all broadcasted events, including full email details (subjects, sender/receiver info) and server metrics.
Attack Impact
Real-time notification of new emails
Email metadata (sender, subject, recipients)
Mailbox statistics
All WebSocket broadcast data
Recommended Fix
The CheckOrigin function should be removed to allow gorilla/websocket to enforce its default safe behavior (checking that the Origin matches the Host). Alternatively, strict validation logic should be implemented.
Proposed Change (Remove unsafe check):
var upgrader = websocket.Upgrader{
ReadBufferSize: 1024,
WriteBufferSize: 1024,
// CheckOrigin: func(r *http.Request) bool { return true }, // REMOVED
EnableCompression: true,
}
Proof of Concept (PoC): To reproduce this vulnerability:
Start Mailpit (default settings).
Save the following HTML code as poc.html and serve it from a different origin (e.g., using python http.server on port 8000 or opening it directly as a file).
Open the poc_websocket_hijack.html file in your browser.
Send a test email to Mailpit or perform any action in the Mailpit UI.
Observe that the "malicious" page successfully receives the event data.
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- omarkurt

