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بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
The nginx-ui application is vulnerable to a Race Condition. Due to the complete absence of synchronization mechanisms (Mutex) and non-atomic file writes, concurrent requests lead to the severe corruption of the primary configuration file (app.ini). This vulnerability results in a persistent Denial of Service (DoS) and introduces a non-deterministic path for Remote Code Execution (RCE) through configuration cross-contamination.
Details
The vulnerability exists because the settings update pipeline does not implement any synchronization primitives. When multiple requests reach the handler simultaneously:
Memory Corruption:
ProtectedFill()modifies shared global singleton pointers without thread-safety, leading to inconsistent states in memory.File Corruption: The underlying library (
gopkg.in/ini.v1) performs direct overwrites. Concurrent write operations interleave at the OS level, resulting inapp.inifiles with empty leading lines, truncated fields, or partially overwritten configuration keys.State Persistent Failure: Depending on which bytes are corrupted, the application either fails its "is-installed" check (redirecting to
/install) or encounters a fatal error during boot/runtime that prevents the process from responding to any further requests.
Environment:
OS: Kali Linux 6.17.10-1kali1 (6.17.10+kali-amd64)
Application Version: nginx-ui v2.3.3 (513) e5da6dd (go1.26.0)
Deployment: Docker Container
PoC
-
Check original app.ini file valid state:
-
Log in to the
nginx-uidashboard. -
Navigate to Preferences and update settings. Capture a
POST /api/settingsrequest and send it to Burp Suite Intruder. -
Configure the attack with Null payloads (to test basic concurrency) or a Fuzzing list (to test data-driven corruption).
-
Set the Resource Pool to 20-50 concurrent requests.
-
Observation (In-flight corruption): Monitor the
app.inifile. You will observe the file being written with empty leading lines or incomplete key-value pairs.
Observation (Recovery Failure): If the service redirects to
/install, attempting to complete the setup again often fails because the underlying configuration state is too corrupted to be reconciled by the installer logic.Observation (Total Service Collapse): When the corruption in
app.inibecomes so severe, the Go runtime or the INI parser encounters a fatal error, causing the Nginx-UI service to stop responding entirely (Hard DoS).
-
Observation (Cross-Section Contamination): During testing, it was observed that sometimes INI sections become interleaved. For example, fields belonging to the
[nginx]section (likeConfigDirorReloadCmd) were erroneously written under the[webauthn]section.Example of corrupted output observed:
[webauthn]
RPDisplayName =
RPID =
RPOrigins =
gDirWhiteList =
ConfigDir = /etc/nginx
ConfigPath =
PIDPath = /run/nginx.pid
SbinPath =
TestConfigCmd =
ReloadCmd = nginx -s reload
RestartCmd = nginx -s stop
StubStatusPort = 51820
ContainerName =
Impact
This is a High security risk (CWE-362: Race Condition).
Integrity: Permanent corruption of application settings and system-level configuration.
Availability: High. The attack results in a persistent Denial of Service that cannot be recovered via the web UI.
Remote Code Execution (RCE) Risk: Since the application allows updating certain fields (like Node Name) and uses others as shell commands (like ReloadCmd or RestartCmd), the observed "cross-contamination" of INI values means an attacker could potentially force a user-controlled string into a command execution field. If ReloadCmd is overwritten with a malicious payload provided in another field, the next nginx reload will execute that payload. While highly impactful, this specific exploit path is non-deterministic and depends on the precise interleaving of thread execution, making targeted exploitation difficult.
Recommended Mitigation
Implement Mutex Locking: Wrap the
ProtectedFillandsettings.Save()calls in async.Mutexto serialize access to global settings.Atomic File Writes: Implement a "write-then-rename" strategy. Write the new configuration to
app.ini.tmpand useos.Rename()to replace the original file atomically, ensuring the configuration file is always in a valid state.
A patched version of nginx-ui is available at https://github.com/0xJacky/nginx-ui/releases/tag/v2.3.4.
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- dapickle

