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Summary
free5GC's SMF mounts the UPI management route group without inbound OAuth2 middleware (same root cause as the broader UPI auth gap reported in free5gc/free5gc#887). On top of that, the DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/{upNodeRef} handler unconditionally dereferences upNode.UPF after the type-guarded async release, even though AN-typed nodes are constructed without a UPF object. As a result, a single unauthenticated DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/gNB1 request crashes the handler with a nil-pointer panic AND mutates the in-memory user-plane topology before panicking (the UpNodeDelete(upNodeRef) line runs first). This is an unauthenticated, state-mutating panic-DoS sink that an off-path network attacker can trigger by name against any AN entry.
Details
Validated against the SMF container in the official Docker compose lab.
Source repo tag:
v4.2.1Running Docker image:
free5gc/smf:v4.2.1Runtime SMF commit:
8385c00aDocker validation date: 2026-03-22 local (container log timestamp
2026-03-21T23:43:17Z)SMF endpoint:
http://10.100.200.6:8000
Control comparison on the same SMF instance:
GET /nsmf-oam/v1/(no token) ->401 UnauthorizedDELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/gNB1(no token) ->500 Internal Server Error(panic)
The sibling nsmf-oam returning 401 proves OAuth middleware IS wired in for other SMF route groups; the UPI group specifically is mounted without it.
Vulnerable handler logic (paths in free5gc/smf):
// NFs/smf/internal/sbi/api_upi.go:94..99
if upNode.Type == smf_context.UPNODE_UPF {
go s.Processor().ReleaseAllResourcesOfUPF(upNode.UPF)
}
upi.UpNodeDelete(upNodeRef)
upNode.UPF.CancelAssociation() // <-- panics for AN-typed nodes; nil UPF
The Type == UPNODE_UPF guard only protects the asynchronous ReleaseAllResourcesOfUPF call. After that, UpNodeDelete(upNodeRef) runs unconditionally (so the topology mutation lands first), and then upNode.UPF.CancelAssociation() is called unconditionally on a *UPF that is nil for AN nodes by construction.
Code evidence:
UPI group mounted WITHOUT auth middleware:
NFs/smf/internal/sbi/server.go:76NFs/smf/internal/sbi/server.go:78
Protected control comparison (other SMF groups DO use auth):
NFs/smf/internal/sbi/server.go:99NFs/smf/internal/sbi/server.go:105
Delete handler (panic site):
NFs/smf/internal/sbi/api_upi.go:94NFs/smf/internal/sbi/api_upi.go:99
AN nodes are constructed without a UPF object (root cause of the nil deref):
NFs/smf/internal/context/user_plane_information.go:95NFs/smf/internal/context/user_plane_information.go:97
PoC
Reproduced end-to-end against the running SMF at http://10.100.200.6:8000.
Control: protected sibling OAM route returns
401:
curl -i http://10.100.200.6:8000/nsmf-oam/v1/
HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized
Trigger: unauthenticated DELETE on the default AN node
gNB1:
curl -i -X DELETE http://10.100.200.6:8000/upi/v1/upNodesLinks/gNB1
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
SMF container logs (
docker logs --tail 120 smf) show topology mutation landing BEFORE the panic, and the panic stack pointing atapi_upi.go:99:
[INFO][SMF][Init] UPNode [gNB1] found. Deleting it.
[INFO][SMF][Init] Delete UPLink [UPF] <=> [gNB1].
[ERRO][SMF][GIN] panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
github.com/free5gc/smf/internal/sbi.(*Server).DeleteUpNodeLink
/go/src/free5gc/NFs/smf/internal/sbi/api_upi.go:99 +0x298
[INFO][SMF][GIN] | 500 | DELETE | /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/gNB1
The lab state was manually restored after validation by re-creating the AN entry; that POST is restoration-only and is NOT a mitigation.
Impact
Three compounding defects on the same SMF SBI surface:
Missing inbound authentication (CWE-306) and authorization (CWE-862) on the
UPIroute group, so the trigger is reachable to any off-path network attacker who can reach SMF on the SBI -- no token, no session, no UE state needed. The same-instancensmf-oamreturning401proves the middleware is wired in elsewhere and only missing on UPI.NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476) in
DeleteUpNodeLink: theType == UPNODE_UPFguard only covers the async release call, thenupNode.UPF.CancelAssociation()runs unconditionally on AN-typed nodes that have a nilUPFfield by construction.Order of operations (CWE-755 / CWE-754):
UpNodeDelete(upNodeRef)mutates the in-memory user-plane topology BEFORE the dereference panics, so the topology change lands even though the request returns 500. This makes the bug state-mutating, not just a plain panic.
Any party that can reach SMF on the SBI can:
Delete arbitrary named entries (e.g.
gNB1) from SMF's in-memory user-plane topology anonymously via a singleDELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/{ref}request, denying SMF's ability to consider that AN/UPF in subsequent UPF selection / PFCP path establishment for legitimate UE sessions.Trigger a panic on the SMF goroutine for the deleted-AN case, even though Gin recovers the goroutine, leaving the topology in the mutated state above.
Repeat the trigger by name against any AN entry, sustaining the topology denial without ever authenticating.
This is a strict superset of the impact in free5gc/free5gc#887 for this specific code path: same auth bypass, plus a concrete request-triggerable nil deref, plus state mutation that survives the panic.
Affected: free5gc v4.2.1.
Upstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/905 Upstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/smf/pull/199
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p9mg-74mg-cwwr
- https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc
- https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/905
- https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-p9mg-74mg-cwwr
- https://github.com/free5gc/smf/commit/b57bc48081c3d3a2f333d02eb78e4fd31a120deb
- https://github.com/free5gc/smf/pull/199
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-44328
گزارشدهندگان
- LinZiyuu

