نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- <1.23.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.23.0
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 1.22.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.23.0
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
Before the round-1 security sweep, pkg/builder/builder.go passed Environment.spec.builder.command directly into exec.Command(...) after a strings.Fields split, with no validation of the executable path or its arguments. A user who could create or update Environment CRDs in a namespace observed by the buildermgr could thereby point the builder pod at any executable inside the builder image (e.g. /bin/sh -c '...') and execute arbitrary code in the builder pod context.
Affected component
pkg/builder/builder.go:254— call site (exec.Command(buildCmd, buildArgs...)).pkg/builder/builder.go:106— input source:buildCmd, buildArgs = strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[0], strings.Fields(req.BuildCommand)[1:].
Impact
A subject with create / update privilege on Environment objects could:
Cause the builder pod for any package using that environment to execute arbitrary code.
Read whatever files the builder pod has access to inside its
/packagesshared volume (deployment archive payloads for that package).Write arbitrary content into the
/packagesshared volume, which the fetcher subsequently uploads as the package deployment archive.
The builder pod runs in the user's namespace with the fission-builder SA (not the more-privileged executor SA), so the impact is bounded to that namespace's package contents and the builder pod's own filesystem. PR:H reflects that creating / modifying Environment CRDs is typically restricted to cluster admins or platform operators.
Root cause
pkg/builder/builder.go's build-command parser did not validate the resulting executable path. Although exec.Command does not invoke a shell, it does locate the executable via $PATH, and strings.Fields splitting allowed multiple flags / sub-arguments to be passed.
Fix
Released in v1.23.0:
PR #3364 (commit
0f45c911) introducesBuilder.resolveBuildCommandinpkg/builder/builder.go, which:Accepts an empty string (treated as the default
/build).Accepts the literal
/build.Accepts any absolute path that survives
filepath.Cleanand contains no..segments.Rejects anything containing whitespace metacharacters or relative paths.
exec.Commandstill receives only the validated absolute path; sub-arguments continue to come fromstrings.Fieldsof the original string but are now passed positionally with no shell expansion.
Mitigation (until upgrade)
Restrict who can create / update
EnvironmentCRDs to trusted operators only.Audit
Environment.spec.builder.commandvalues for any non-/buildpaths.Run the buildermgr with a tightened ServiceAccount that has no secret access in the builder namespace.
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339
- https://github.com/fission/fission
- https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3364
- https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.23.0
- https://github.com/fission/fission/security/advisories/GHSA-7pjr-qpvh-m339
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-46618
گزارشدهندگان
- b0b0haha
- j311yl0v3u
- sanketsudake

