نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 1.25.0, < 1.26.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.26.0
- نسخههای متأثر
- >=1.25.0 <1.26.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.26.0
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
Me again.
Gitea's built-in 3D file viewer (powered by Online3DViewer) is vulnerable to stored cross-site scripting (XSS) through crafted .gltf files. When a glTF file declares an unsupported required extension, Online3DViewer generates an error message containing the extension name and Gitea inserts it into the DOM using innerHTML without sanitization. An attacker who can push a .gltf file to any repository can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of any user who views the file.
Affected Versions
Gitea 1.25.0 and later (3D file preview was introduced in 1.25 via the Online3DViewer integration)
Confirmed on
gitea:1.25-nightly(SHAe33d1da...), which bundlesonline-3d-viewernpm package v0.16.0The upstream Online3DViewer library is the root cause
Severity
Stored XSS: the payload persists in the repository and fires on every page view
Executes under the Gitea origin with the victim's session (cookies, CSRF tokens)
Any authenticated user viewing the file is compromised
Enables full account takeover (token creation, settings modification, repository manipulation)
No user interaction beyond viewing the file page is required
Details
Root Cause
When Online3DViewer parses a glTF file, it checks whether all extensionsRequired entries are supported. For unsupported extensions, it calls:
// In the Online3DViewer bundle (online-3d-viewer.js)
// Approximate offset 1142618 in the bundled chunk
this.SetError(yp("Unsupported extension: {0}.", unsupportedExtensions.join(", ")));
The SetError method stores this message, and Gitea's rendering code inserts it into the page using innerHTML:
// Gitea's error display handler
element.innerHTML = errorMessage; // unsanitized
The extension names from extensionsRequired are taken directly from the JSON file with no escaping or sanitization, allowing HTML injection.
Attack Vector
An attacker creates a
.gltffile with a maliciousextensionsRequiredvalue:
{
"asset": {"version": "2.0"},
"buffers": [],
"extensionsRequired": ["<img src=x onerror=\"alert(document.cookie)\">"],
"scenes": []
}
-
The attacker pushes this file to any Gitea repository they have write access to (including forks of public repositories).
-
When any user navigates to the file's page in the Gitea web UI, the 3D viewer attempts to render it, encounters the "unsupported extension," and inserts the error message (containing the attacker's HTML) into the DOM via
innerHTML. -
The injected
<img onerror>handler executes arbitrary JavaScript under the Gitea origin with the victim's authenticated session.
Impact
From the XSS context, an attacker can:
Create API access tokens for the victim by POSTing to
/user/settings/applicationswith the page's CSRF tokenRead private repositories via same-origin API calls
Modify repository contents (supply chain attacks)
Escalate to admin if the victim is a Gitea administrator
Exfiltrate data via
fetch,XMLHttpRequest, ornavigator.sendBeacon
Proof of Concept
Minimal PoC (alert box)
Save as poc.gltf and push to any Gitea 1.25+ repository:
{
"asset": {"version": "2.0"},
"buffers": [],
"extensionsRequired": ["<img src=x onerror=\"alert('XSS: '+document.domain)\">"],
"scenes": []
}
Navigate to the file in the Gitea web UI. The alert will fire.
Suggested Fixes
Sanitize or text-encode the error message before DOM insertion. Replace innerHTML with textContent for error display:
// Instead of:
element.innerHTML = errorMessage;
// Use:
element.textContent = errorMessage;
Alternatively, escape HTML entities in the error message before insertion.
Additional hardening
Render 3D file previews inside a sandboxed
<iframe>withsandbox="allow-scripts"and a restrictive CSP (default-src 'none'), similar to how Gitea already handles SVG attachmentsApply Content-Security-Policy headers to file preview pages that restrict inline script execution
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- yonatan-pl

