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Argo Vulnerable to Unauthenticated Memory Exhaustion (DoS) in Webhook Interceptor

متن اصلی

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< 3.7.14
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3.7.14
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<3.7.14
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3.7.14
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>= 4.0.0, < 4.0.5
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4.0.5
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>=4.0.0 <4.0.5
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4.0.5
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بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-42294

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.60%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۷

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Severity: Medium Component: Webhook Interceptor (server/auth/webhook) Vulnerability Type: Denial of Service (DoS)

Description

The Webhook Interceptor loads the entire request body into memory before authenticating the request or verifying its signature. This occurs on the /api/v1/events/ endpoint, which is publicly accessible (albeit intended for webhooks). An attacker can send a request with an extremely large body (e.g., multiple gigabytes), causing the Argo Server to allocate excessive memory, potentially leading to an Out-Of-Memory (OOM) crash and denial of service.

Vulnerable Code

In server/auth/webhook/interceptor.go:

func (i *WebhookInterceptor) addWebhookAuthorization(r *http.Request, kube kubernetes.Interface) error {
    // ... basic checks ...
    
    // Vulnerability: Reads entire body into memory unconditionally
    buf, _ := io.ReadAll(r.Body)
    defer func() { r.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewBuffer(buf)) }()
    
    // ... subsequent logic finds correct service account and secret ...
    // ... verification happens later ...
}

The io.ReadAll call happens before the signature verification loop.

Impact

  • Service Availability: An attacker can crash the Argo Server, disrupting workflow execution and API access for all users.

PoC (Conceptual)

  1. Target the webhook endpoint: POST /api/v1/events/some-namespace

  2. Send a Content-Length: 1000000000 (1GB) header.

  3. Stream 1GB of random data.

  4. Monitor server memory usage. It will spike until 1GB is allocated or the process crashes.

Recommendation

  1. Limit Body Size: Enforce a strict limit on webhook body size (e.g., 10MB) using http.MaxBytesReader.

  2. Streaming Verification: If possible, verify the signature in a streaming fashion or use a temporary file for large payloads (though typically webhooks are small).

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • Rudra2018
  • Joibel
  • isubasinghe