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زیاد

Go-Attestation: Hash injection into trusted measurement list via unskipped SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes in parseEfiSignatureList()

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

بازه‌ها نیاز به بررسی دارند.

نسخه‌های متأثر
<= 0.6.0
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
0.6.1
نسخه‌های متأثر
*
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
اعلام نشده

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-12681

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.27%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۹

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Summary

parseEfiSignatureList() in attest/internal/events.go does not skip SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes before reading EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST signature entries, violating UEFI specification section 31.4.1.

Impact

For hashSHA256SigGUID lists, attacker-controlled vendor header bytes are appended directly to the trusted SHA256 hash list. A crafted TPM event log can inject arbitrary SHA256 hashes into the verifier's trusted measurement database, allowing a remote attestation verifier to accept a compromised boot state as legitimate — breaking the core integrity guarantee of remote attestation.

Root Cause

After binary.Read(&signatures.Header) reads 28 bytes, buf points to the start of the SignatureHeaderSize vendor bytes. Both entry loops start at sigOffset := 0 instead of sigOffset := SignatureHeaderSize, causing vendor bytes to be read as signature entries.

Affected versions

All versions through commit f877374 (2026-05-15).

Fix

Pull request: https://github.com/google/go-attestation/pull/502

  • Add bound check: SignatureHeaderSize must not exceed remaining list space

  • Skip SignatureHeaderSize bytes before both entry loops

  • Regression test: TestParseEfiSignatureListNonZeroSignatureHeaderSize

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • prasanna8585
  • massif-01
  • berserker-systems