نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 0.91.1
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.91.1
- نسخههای متأثر
- <0.91.2
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.91.2
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
The SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation handler in internal/integrations/ingestors/sns/sns.go makes an unvalidated
http.Get() call to payload.UnsubscribeURL without any URL restriction. Because UnsubscribeURL is intentionally
excluded from the BuildSignature() signed field list, an attacker can replace this field in a legitimately
AWS-signed message with an arbitrary internal URL, bypassing the VerifyPayload() signature check entirely and
triggering a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) against internal infrastructure — including the EC2 Instance Metadata
Service (IMDS) at 169.254.169.254.
Impact
This is a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability. An attacker with a Hatchet account and an AWS Free Tier account can:
Reach the EC2 IMDS endpoint and retrieve IAM temporary credentials if Hatchet is deployed on AWS
Port-scan and probe internal services not exposed to the internet
Access internal HTTP APIs (e.g., Kubernetes API server, internal dashboards) from the Hatchet server's network context
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499
- https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet
- https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/commit/2d211bce16e5022afaf95780de82dc30e0bcba98
- https://github.com/hatchet-dev/hatchet/security/advisories/GHSA-fjwv-jf2v-j499
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61681
گزارشدهندگان
- aslein1413-sys
- mnafees
- zuhairhalawa

