نسخههای متأثر
بازهها نیاز به بررسی دارند.
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 2.97.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 2.97.0
- نسخههای متأثر
- <2.97.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 2.97.0
- نسخههای متأثر
- *
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- اعلام نشده
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
A security vulnerability has been identified in GitHub CLI that could allow attestation verification bypass when using gh attestation verify with --signer-repo or --signer-workflow flags. GitHub CLI builds the certificate matcher from these flag values without escaping regex metacharacters, so a repository or workflow name is treated as a regular expression rather than a literal string. GitHub permits characters such as . in organization, repository, and workflow path names, and . is a regex wildcard, so a malicious actor can create a lookalike name that satisfies a matcher intended for a different, trusted signer.
Details
GitHub CLI constructs a regular expression from the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow values and matches it against the signing certificate's SAN (Subject Alternative Name) during Sigstore attestation verification. The user-supplied value is interpolated into the pattern without escaping regex metacharacters, so any metacharacter permitted in a GitHub path is interpreted as regex syntax instead of a literal character.
The most practical case is . , which GitHub allows in org/repo names and is a regex wildcard meaning "any single character." For example, an attacker-controlled repository named:
github/artifact.attestations-workflows
matches a verifier configured for the trusted signer:
github/artifact-attestations-workflows
because the unescaped . in the constructed pattern matches the - in the attacker's name (and any other single character at that position). This affected the --signer-repo and --signer-workflow flags but did not affect the --repo and --owner flags which include an exact string comparison.
In v2.97.0, the GitHub CLI escapes the user-supplied signer values before they are incorporated into the SAN matcher, so they are matched as literal strings.
Impact
The practical impact is limited, exploitation requires the attacker to create a plausible lookalike repository name and produce valid Sigstore attestations from it. This could undermine supply chain verification for CI/CD pipelines or policy gates that use these flags to pin trust to a specific signing workflow.
Remediation and Mitigation
Upgrade
ghtov2.97.0or later, which escapes signer values before matching.As a workaround, use
--repoor--ownerflags instead of--signer-repoor--signer-workflowwhere applicable.Manually inspect the signing certificate SAN in attestation output to confirm the signing workflow origin.
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mm27-mwq9-fr5g
- https://github.com/cli/cli
- https://github.com/cli/cli/commit/55dbb4dc6b7edb10b48e3d7fc5bccd32318d1b55
- https://github.com/cli/cli/releases/tag/v2.97.0
- https://github.com/cli/cli/security/advisories/GHSA-mm27-mwq9-fr5g
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64655
گزارشدهندگان
- babakks
- BagToad
- helixplant
- ajbeattie
- bdehamer

