همهٔ گزارش‌ها
متوسط

hyper-staticfile's location header incorporates user input, allowing open redirect

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

بازه‌ها نیاز به بررسی دارند.

Rust / Cargohyper-staticfile
نسخه‌های متأثر
< 0.9.4
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
0.9.4
Rust / Cargohyper-staticfile
نسخه‌های متأثر
>= 0.10.0-alpha.1, < 0.10.0-alpha.5
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
0.10.0-alpha.5
Rust / Cargohyper-staticfile
نسخه‌های متأثر
>=0.0.0-0 <0.9.4 || >=0.10.0-0 <0.10.0-alpha.5
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
0.10.0-alpha.5 · 0.9.4

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

When hyper-staticfile performs a redirect for a directory request (e.g. a request for /dir that redirects to /dir/), the Location header value was derived from user input (the request path), simply appending a slash. The intent was to perform an origin-relative redirect, but specific inputs allowed performing a scheme-relative redirect instead.

An attacker could craft a special URL that would appear to be for the correct domain, but immediately redirects to a malicious domain. Such a URL can benefit phishing attacks, for example an innocent looking link in an email.

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