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ZeptoClaw: Path boundary checks bypass via symlink, TOCTOU, and hardlink

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نسخه‌های متأثر

Rust / Cargozeptoclaw
نسخه‌های متأثر
<= 0.7.5
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
0.7.6

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-32232

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.70%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۷

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Summary

Workspace boundary enforcement currently has three related bypass risks. This issue tracks fixing all three in one pull request.

Details
R1 - Dangling Symlink Component Bypass
  • What happens: Path validation can miss dangling symlink components during traversal checks.

  • Why it matters: A symlink that is unresolved at validation time can later resolve to an external location.

  • Impact: Read and write operations may escape workspace boundaries.

  • Affected area: src/security/path.rs (check_symlink_escape).

R2 - TOCTOU Between Validation and Use
  • What happens: The path is validated first, then used later for filesystem operations.

  • Why it matters: A concurrent filesystem change can swap path components after validation but before open/write.

  • Impact: Race-based workspace escape is possible.

  • Affected area: Filesystem and file-consuming tools that call validate_path_in_workspace before I/O.

R3 - Hardlink Alias Bypass
  • What happens: A file inside workspace can be a hardlink to an inode outside the intended workspace trust boundary.

  • Why it matters: Prefix and symlink checks can pass while data access still mutates or reads external content.

  • Impact: Policy bypass for read/write operations.

  • Affected area: Any tool that reads or writes via validated paths.

Risk Matrix
ID Risk Severity Likelihood Impact
R1 Dangling symlink component bypass High Medium Workspace boundary escape for read/write
R2 Validate/use TOCTOU race High Medium Race-based boundary escape during file I/O
R3 Hardlink alias bypass Medium Low-Medium External inode read/write through in-workspace path
PoC
R1 - Dangling symlink component bypass
  1. Create a symlink inside workspace pointing to a missing target.

  2. Validate a path traversing that symlink.

  3. Create the target directory outside workspace after validation.

  4. Perform file operation and observe potential boundary escape if not fail-closed.

R2 - TOCTOU between validation and use
  1. Validate a candidate in-workspace path.

  2. Before open/write, replace an intermediate component with a link to external location.

  3. Continue with the file operation.

  4. Observe boundary escape if operation trusts only stale validation result.

R3 - Hardlink alias bypass
  1. Place a hardlink inside workspace that points to an external inode.

  2. Validate the in-workspace hardlink path.

  3. Read or write through this path.

  4. Observe external inode access through a path that appears in-scope.

Impacts

Unauthorized cross path boundary

Credit

@zpbrent

Patch

f50c17e11ae3e2d40c96730abac41974ef2ee2a8

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • zpbrent