نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 0.89.3
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.89.3
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
Salvo's form data parsing implementations (form_data() method and Extractible macro) do not enforce payload size limits before reading request bodies into memory. This allows attackers to cause Out-of-Memory (OOM) conditions by sending extremely large payloads, leading to service crashes and denial of service.
Details
Vulnerability Description
Three attack vectors exist in Salvo's form handling:
-
URL-encoded form data (
application/x-www-form-urlencoded)Request::form_data()callsBodyExt::collect(body)which reads the entire body into memory without size checkingAffects handlers using
req.form_data().awaitdirectly
-
Multipart form data (
multipart/form-data)Similar unbounded memory allocation during parsing
Affects handlers processing multipart uploads
-
Extractible macro
#[derive(Extractible)]with#[salvo(extract(default_source(from = "body")))]internally callsform_data()Vulnerabilities propagate to all extractors using body sources
Root Cause
The FormData::read() implementation prioritizes convenience over safety by reading entire request bodies before validation. Even when Request::payload_with_max_size() is available, it's not automatically applied in the form parsing path.
PoC
run
Extract data from requestexample in readme.md in docker file with limited memory say 100mb.Send
application/x-www-form-urlencodedORmultipart/form-datapayload to the endpoint.The server process OOM-crashes, instead of returning 413 error.
Impact
Immediate Effects
Service Unavailability: Servers crash under memory pressure
Resource Exhaustion: Single request can consume all available memory
Cascading Failures: In containerized environments, OOM can affect other services
Attack Characteristics
Low Cost: Attacker needs minimal bandwidth (header only, body can be streamed)
No Authentication: Exploitable on public endpoints
Difficult to Rate-Limit: Traditional rate limiting may not prevent single large request
Amplification: Small network cost → large memory consumption
Real-World Scenarios
Public API endpoints accepting form data
User registration/profile update handlers
File upload endpoints using multipart forms
Any endpoint using
#[derive(Extractible)]with body sources
Suggestion: Make Multipart File Upload Handling Explicit Opt-In
Problem Statement
Currently, Salvo's multipart form data parsing automatically handles file uploads without explicit developer intent. This creates several security and usability concerns:
Unintended File Storage: Developers may unknowingly accept file uploads when they only intended to handle text fields
Disk Space Exhaustion: Automatic file buffering to disk can fill storage without proper limits
Resource Cleanup: Temporary files may not be properly cleaned up if handlers don't expect them
Attack Surface: Endpoints inadvertently become file upload targets
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- yshing

