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Zebra Transparent SIGHASH_SINGLE Corresponding-Output Handling Diverges From zcashd
Summary
For V5+ transparent spends, Zebra and zcashd disagree on the same consensus rule: SIGHASH_SINGLE must fail when the input index has no corresponding output. zcashd treats this as consensus-invalid under ZIP-244, while Zebra's transparent verification path computes a digest for the missing-output case instead of failing.
The result is a direct block-validity split. A malformed V5 transparent transaction can be accepted by Zebra, retained in Zebra's mempool, selected into Zebra getblocktemplate, mined into a block, and then rejected by zcashd.
Details
Validated code revisions used during analysis:
zcashd:2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5Zebra:a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb
Scope note:
earlier triage material grouped pre-V5 and V5 behavior together;
re-execution on the pinned revisions did not reproduce the claimed pre-V5 / V4 reject-side behavior;
this advisory therefore covers the V5+ / ZIP-244 variant only.
zcashd side:
Transparent scripts in blocks are checked through
TransactionSignatureChecker::CheckSig()andSignatureHash():zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp.In the ZIP-244 branch,
SignatureHash()explicitly throws whenSIGHASH_SINGLEorSIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAYis used withnIn >= txTo.vout.size():zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp.CheckSig()catches that exception and returnsfalse, causing the transparent script to fail.
Zebra side:
V5 transparent inputs route into the same FFI-based transparent script verifier used for block validation:
zebra/zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs.Zebraconverts the decoded hash type and asks its Rust sighash engine for a digest without adding the corresponding-output pre-check thatzcashdenforces first:zebra/zebra-script/src/lib.rs,zebra/zebra-chain/src/primitives/zcash_primitives.rs.Zebraforwards canonicalSIGHASH_SINGLEinto the Rust ZIP-244 implementation.In that implementation, when
input.index() >= bundle.vout.len(), the code usestransparent_outputs_hash::<TxOut>(&[])instead of erroring:zcash_primitives/src/transaction/sighash_v5.rs,zcash_primitives/src/transaction/sighash_v5.rs.
Why this is exploitable:
the malformed transaction only needs fewer transparent outputs than inputs;
the attacker signs the digest that
Zebracomputes for the missing-output case;Zebrathen sees a valid transparent signature, whilezcashdnever reaches the same digest because it fails first.
Ordinary path viability:
zcashdordinary mempool admission is not the practical trigger path, because the same ZIP-244SignatureHash()checks fail there first:zcash/src/main.cpp,zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp.Zebraordinary mempool admission is viable becauseZebrauses the same transparent verifier for mempool and block validation and does not have a separate "one output per input" standardness rule here:zebra/zebra-consensus/src/transaction.rs,zebra/zebrad/src/components/mempool/storage.rs.Zebrais a block-template producer, so the realistic stock path isZebramempool ->Zebragetblocktemplate-> external miner:zebra/zebra-rpc/src/methods/types/get_block_template/zip317.rs.
PoC
Validated commits:
zcashd:2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5Zebra:a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb
Manual reproduction steps:
Build an otherwise-valid V5 transaction with at least two transparent inputs and only one transparent output.
Sign input
0normally.Sign input
1with canonicalSIGHASH_SINGLEorSIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY.Use the digest returned by
Zebra's ZIP-244 path, where the missing output contributestransparent_outputs_hash([]).Submit the transaction to
Zebraand tozcashd.Observe:
Zebraaccepts it into the mempool;Zebraselects it intogetblocktemplate;Zebracan mine and accept a block containing it;zcashdrejects it in the ordinary mempool path.
Impact
This is a direct V5+ transparent consensus split.
Who can trigger it:
an ordinary transaction author can craft the malformed V5 transparent transaction;
the accept-side stock path is
Zebra's mempool and block-template path;an external miner still has to include the transaction in a block for the split to materialize.
Who is impacted:
Zebracan accept and template a transaction / block thatzcashdrejects;this makes the issue both a consensus-divergence problem and a practical
Zebrablock-template safety problem.
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- sangsoo-osec
- defuse
- mpguerra
- arya2
- upbqdn

