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Zebra's Transparent SIGHASH_SINGLE Handling Diverges from zcashd for Corresponding Outputs

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نسخه‌های متأثر

Rust / Cargozebrad
نسخه‌های متأثر
< 4.4.0
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
4.4.0

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-104437

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.25%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۸

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Zebra Transparent SIGHASH_SINGLE Corresponding-Output Handling Diverges From zcashd

Summary

For V5+ transparent spends, Zebra and zcashd disagree on the same consensus rule: SIGHASH_SINGLE must fail when the input index has no corresponding output. zcashd treats this as consensus-invalid under ZIP-244, while Zebra's transparent verification path computes a digest for the missing-output case instead of failing.

The result is a direct block-validity split. A malformed V5 transparent transaction can be accepted by Zebra, retained in Zebra's mempool, selected into Zebra getblocktemplate, mined into a block, and then rejected by zcashd.

Details

Validated code revisions used during analysis:

  • zcashd: 2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5

  • Zebra: a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb

Scope note:

  • earlier triage material grouped pre-V5 and V5 behavior together;

  • re-execution on the pinned revisions did not reproduce the claimed pre-V5 / V4 reject-side behavior;

  • this advisory therefore covers the V5+ / ZIP-244 variant only.

zcashd side:

  • Transparent scripts in blocks are checked through TransactionSignatureChecker::CheckSig() and SignatureHash(): zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp.

  • In the ZIP-244 branch, SignatureHash() explicitly throws when SIGHASH_SINGLE or SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY is used with nIn >= txTo.vout.size(): zcash/src/script/interpreter.cpp.

  • CheckSig() catches that exception and returns false, causing the transparent script to fail.

Zebra side:

Why this is exploitable:

  • the malformed transaction only needs fewer transparent outputs than inputs;

  • the attacker signs the digest that Zebra computes for the missing-output case;

  • Zebra then sees a valid transparent signature, while zcashd never reaches the same digest because it fails first.

Ordinary path viability:

PoC

Validated commits:

  • zcashd: 2c63e9aa08cb170b0feb374161bea94720c3e1f5

  • Zebra: a905fa19e3a91c7b4ead331e2709e6dec5db12cb

Manual reproduction steps:

  1. Build an otherwise-valid V5 transaction with at least two transparent inputs and only one transparent output.

  2. Sign input 0 normally.

  3. Sign input 1 with canonical SIGHASH_SINGLE or SIGHASH_SINGLE|ANYONECANPAY.

  4. Use the digest returned by Zebra's ZIP-244 path, where the missing output contributes transparent_outputs_hash([]).

  5. Submit the transaction to Zebra and to zcashd.

  6. Observe:

    • Zebra accepts it into the mempool;

    • Zebra selects it into getblocktemplate;

    • Zebra can mine and accept a block containing it;

    • zcashd rejects it in the ordinary mempool path.

Impact

This is a direct V5+ transparent consensus split.

Who can trigger it:

  • an ordinary transaction author can craft the malformed V5 transparent transaction;

  • the accept-side stock path is Zebra's mempool and block-template path;

  • an external miner still has to include the transaction in a block for the split to materialize.

Who is impacted:

  • Zebra can accept and template a transaction / block that zcashd rejects;

  • this makes the issue both a consensus-divergence problem and a practical Zebra block-template safety problem.

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • sangsoo-osec
  • defuse
  • mpguerra
  • arya2
  • upbqdn