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بحرانی

JinJava Bypass through ForTag leads to Arbitrary Java Execution

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

نسخه‌های متأثر
>= 2.8.0, < 2.8.3
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
2.8.3
نسخه‌های متأثر
< 2.7.6
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
2.7.6

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-25526

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.97%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۸

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Impact

Vulnerability Type: Sandbox Bypass / Remote Code Execution

Affected Component: Jinjava

Affected Users:

  • Organizations using HubSpot's Jinjava template rendering engine for user-provided template content

  • Any system that renders untrusted Jinja templates using HubSpot's Jinjava implementation

  • Users with the ability to create or edit custom code templates

Severity: Critical - allows arbitrary Java class instantiation and file access bypassing built-in sandbox restrictions

Root Cause: Multiple security bypass vulnerabilities in Jinjava's sandbox mechanism:

  1. ForTag Property Access Bypass: The ForTag class does not enforce JinjavaBeanELResolver restrictions when iterating over object properties using Introspector.getBeanInfo() and invoking getter methods via PropertyDescriptor.getReadMethod()

  2. Restricted Class Instantiation: The sandbox's type allowlist can be bypassed by using ObjectMapper to instantiate classes through JSON deserialization, including creating new JinjavaELContext and JinjavaConfig instances

Attack Vector: An attacker with the ability to create or edit Jinja templates can:

  • Access arbitrary getter methods on objects in the template context

  • Instantiate ObjectMapper to enable default typing

  • Create arbitrary Java classes by bypassing type allowlists

  • Read files from the server filesystem (demonstrated with /etc/passwd)

  • Potentially execute arbitrary code

Patches

Status: Patched - CVE-2026-25526

Users should upgrade to one of the following versions which contain fixes for this vulnerability:

  • JinJava 2.8.3 or later

  • JinJava 2.7.6 or later

Fix Components:

  1. ForTag Security Hardening

    • Added security checks to ForTag.renderForCollection() to enforce JinjavaBeanELResolver restrictions

    • Implemented property access validation against restricted properties/methods before invoking getter methods

    • Added checks for restricted class types before introspection

  2. Enhanced Type Validation

    • Improved validation in JinjavaBeanELResolver.isRestrictedClass() to prevent instantiation of sensitive types

    • Added additional restricted types to the denylist

    • Implemented deeper validation for types created via ObjectMapper deserialization

  3. Configuration Protection

    • Added checks to prevent creation of new JinjavaConfig or JinjavaELContext instances via ObjectMapper

    • Prevented modification of readOnlyResolver configuration from untrusted templates

    • Implemented additional safeguards around ELResolver configuration

  4. Collection Type Validation

    • Implemented proper type validation in HubLELResolver to prevent collection type wrapping bypasses

    • Added checks for wrapped types in collection deserialization

    • Implemented validation for all types within collections against allowlists

  5. ObjectMapper Restrictions

    • Added additional restrictions on ObjectMapper.enableDefaultTyping() to prevent enabling via less restrictive ELResolver

    • Ensured default typing cannot be enabled without proper authorization

Information for Users: Upgrade to version 2.8.3 or 2.7.6 or later to address this vulnerability.

References

Project Resources
Security Standards & Classifications
  • CWE-502: Deserialization of Untrusted Data

  • CWE-913: Improper Control of Dynamically-Managed Code Resources

  • CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')

  • CVSS v3.1: Common Vulnerability Scoring System

Additional Resources

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • twilliamson-an
  • akues-an
  • jasmith-hs