نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 2.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 2.0
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
A configuration-dependent origin validation bypass was identified in Appsmith’s password reset and email verification flows on current release.
Both flows derive the email-link base URL from the request Origin header. The current validation only enforces a trusted base URL when APPSMITH_BASE_URL is configured. If that setting is unset, the application accepts the caller-supplied origin and uses it to generate token-bearing reset and verification links.
On deployments with email delivery enabled and APPSMITH_BASE_URL unset, this can cause Appsmith to send security-sensitive links whose clickable host is attacker-controlled, which can plausibly lead to account takeover after victim interaction.
Details
The current release head at commit e77639eca4974469c1e676904851ffdaedd38111 was reviewed.
The relevant routes are publicly reachable in SecurityConfig.java:
POST /forgotPasswordis permitted without authentication at line209POST /resendEmailVerificationis permitted without authentication at line228
In UserControllerCE.java, both flows copy the request Origin header into the DTO field used as the email-link base URL:
forgotPasswordRequest(...)at lines91-94resendEmailVerification(...)at lines189-193
In UserServiceCEImpl.java, base URL validation is conditional:
@Value("${APPSMITH_BASE_URL:}")at line113resolveSecureBaseUrl(...)at lines132-145
That method explicitly documents and implements this behavior:
if
APPSMITH_BASE_URLis configured, the provided URL must match itif
APPSMITH_BASE_URLis unset, the provided URL is accepted for backward compatibility
The resulting base URL is then used to construct token-bearing links:
FORGOT_PASSWORD_CLIENT_URL_FORMATat line149reset URL generation at lines
282-289EMAIL_VERIFICATION_CLIENT_URL_FORMATat line152verification URL generation at lines
931-940
This means the base URL is not only used for branding or display purposes. It directly controls the clickable host of security-sensitive reset and verification links.
Note that the admin UI describes APPSMITH_BASE_URL as required for password reset and email verification links in:
app/client/src/ce/pages/AdminSettings/config/configuration.tsxat lines41-49
The reviewed self-host material indicates this protection is not fail-closed by default, which makes the vulnerable condition realistic on existing deployments where operators have not set APPSMITH_BASE_URL.
PoC
These steps were designed for validation on an Appsmith deployment that I own or am explicitly authorized to test.
Deploy a non-production Appsmith instance from current
release, or any build containing the affected code.Enable outbound email delivery.
Leave
APPSMITH_BASE_URLunset or blank.Use a test mailbox account you control, for example
victim@example.test.Send a password reset request with a forged
Originheader:
curl -i -X POST 'https://YOUR-INSTANCE/api/v1/users/forgotPassword' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Origin: https://attacker.example' \
--data '{"email":"victim@example.test"}'
Inspect the delivered email. If affected, the clickable reset link is generated under
https://attacker.example/...instead of the legitimate Appsmith host.Repeat the same validation for resend email verification using an unverified test account:
curl -i -X POST 'https://YOUR-INSTANCE/api/v1/users/resendEmailVerification' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Origin: https://attacker.example' \
--data '{"email":"victim@example.test"}'
Inspect the delivered verification email. If affected, the clickable verification link is generated under
https://attacker.example/....Set
APPSMITH_BASE_URL=https://YOUR-INSTANCE, restart the server, and repeat the same requests.The expected secure behavior is that mismatched
Originis rejected, or the generated links no longer follow the forged request header.
Live tokens, third-party data, or unsafe exploitation material was not included in this report. The attached archive contains source excerpts, data-flow proof, safe validation notes, and supporting evidence collected from the reviewed current branch.
Impact
This is a trust-boundary failure in token-bearing email authentication flows.
Affected deployments are those where:
APPSMITH_BASE_URLis unset or blankoutbound email is enabled
password reset and/or email verification flows are enabled
Attacker requirements are low:
no prior authentication is required to reach the relevant endpoints
the attacker only needs to trigger an email flow toward a target account
Security impact:
Appsmith can generate password reset or verification emails whose clickable host is attacker-controlled
victim interaction can expose security-sensitive token material
this can plausibly result in account takeover
at minimum, it enables trusted-email abuse and phishing through the application itself
mitigation
Remove the fallback behavior in
resolveSecureBaseUrl(...)that accepts caller-supplied origin data whenAPPSMITH_BASE_URLis unset.Fail closed for all token-bearing email flows when no trusted base URL is configured.
Use a single trusted-base-url helper across:
password reset
resend email verification
invite flows
instance admin invite flows
Add regression tests for the unset-configuration case.
Add startup or admin-level validation so security-sensitive email flows cannot operate until a trusted base URL is configured.
Attachment
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- 0xmrma

