نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 5.33.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 5.33.0
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Vulnerability Summary
com.rabbitmq.client.TrustEverythingTrustManager accepts ANY TLS certificate (including null chains) and is used as the default trust manager when calling ConnectionFactory.useSslProtocol() without arguments. Combined with hostname verification being disabled by default, this enables trivial man-in-the-middle attacks.
Affected Components
com.rabbitmq.client.TrustEverythingTrustManager— accepts any certificatecom.rabbitmq.client.ConnectionFactory.useSslProtocol()— uses TrustEverythingTrustManagerHostname verification disabled by default (
enableHostnameVerification()must be called explicitly)com.rabbitmq.client.ConnectionFactory.getPassword()— returns plaintext with no redactionDefault port 5672 (plaintext) with PLAIN SASL — credentials sent unencrypted
POC (Verified on Java 21, amqp-client 5.25.0)
// TrustEverythingTrustManager accepts ANY certificate including null
TrustEverythingTrustManager tm = new TrustEverythingTrustManager();
tm.checkServerTrusted(null, "RSA"); // No exception — accepts null cert chain
tm.getAcceptedIssuers(); // Returns empty array — trusts all CAs
// ConnectionFactory defaults
ConnectionFactory factory = new ConnectionFactory();
factory.useSslProtocol(); // Uses TrustEverythingTrustManager internally
// enableHostnameVerification() NOT called by default
// Credential exposure
factory.setPassword("secret_password_123");
factory.getPassword(); // Returns "secret_password_123" — no redaction
// Default plaintext port
factory.getPort(); // 5672 (plaintext, not 5671/TLS)
// PLAIN SASL sends cleartext credentials
PlainMechanism pm = new PlainMechanism();
// handleChallenge() sends username+password in cleartext
Attack Scenarios
MITM: Attacker presents self-signed cert →
TrustEverythingTrustManageraccepts it → all RabbitMQ traffic interceptedCredential theft: Default plaintext port (5672) + PLAIN SASL = credentials readable on network
DNS rebinding: No hostname verification → attacker DNS record → MITM without cert
Logging exposure:
getPassword()returns plaintext → credentials in logs/stack traces
Suggested Fix
Deprecate
TrustEverythingTrustManager— it should never be used in productionuseSslProtocol()should use the JVM default trust store, not TrustEverythingEnable hostname verification by default
Redact password in
getPassword()or remove the public getterWarn when using PLAIN SASL without TLS
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-5m9f-rphj-c435
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/1e7deb2e6020c9793a81385a53ea378ec63b9339
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/commit/a4bf571dd368765baaa9cecfae68ce09f1bdcc01
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/1999
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/pull/2001
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/releases/tag/v5.33.0
- https://github.com/rabbitmq/rabbitmq-java-client/security/advisories/GHSA-5m9f-rphj-c435
گزارشدهندگان
- lucianjohnhouse

