نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 0.23.34
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.23.35
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 0.23.34
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.23.35
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.0.0-M47
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.0.0-M47
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 0.23.34
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.23.35
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
Ember's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the Transfer-Encoding header value
with a case-sensitive substring test (hValue.contains("chunked")). RFC
9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A
request carrying Transfer-Encoding: Chunked (capital C) is therefore not
recognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by Content-Length
(or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by
chunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body
ends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).
The same line of code admits two further variants:
The substring test misfires on
Transfer-Encoding: notchunked(an inverse desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary rejects the unknown coding).Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under UTF-8 the wire bytes
E2 84 AAdecode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, whichString.equalsIgnoreCaseUnicode-case-folds tok, soTransfer-Encoding: chun<U+212A>edmatcheschunkedonce the comparison is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.
Impact
Server
Request smuggling when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that
honours Transfer-Encoding case-insensitively per RFC, forwards the header
value verbatim, and reuses keep-alive connections to the backend:
Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary's ACL/auth layer would have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.
Cross-user request hijack: a partial smuggled prefix left in Ember's connection buffer is concatenated with the next victim's request on the same pooled backend connection, exposing its headers (e.g.
Cookie,Authorization) to the attacker.Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.
Client
ember-client shares the same HeaderP.parse on the response path, enabling
response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway. This is less severe: it
requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote
client.
Preconditions
Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)
ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary
Intermediary treats
Transfer-Encodingcase-insensitively (per RFC) and forwards the header value without lowercasing itMalicious or compromised upstream (client)
Workarounds
Intermediary fully buffers and re-encodes request bodies (e.g. nginx with default
proxy_request_buffering on)Intermediary normalises the
Transfer-Encodingvalue (lowercases the token) before forwardingDisable backend keep-alive between the intermediary and Ember
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-9998-894r-fwvr
- https://github.com/http4s/http4s
- https://github.com/http4s/http4s/commit/5e88b2e7b4e6ea2f0c61040a4bc9de0d73e51217
- https://github.com/http4s/http4s/releases/tag/v0.23.35
- https://github.com/http4s/http4s/releases/tag/v1.0.0-M47
- https://github.com/http4s/http4s/security/advisories/GHSA-9998-894r-fwvr
گزارشدهندگان
- ERobertGII
- rossabaker

