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زیاد

Http4s Ember Transfer-Encoding value parsing (TE.CL / TE.0 request smuggling)

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

نسخه‌های متأثر
<= 0.23.34
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
0.23.35
نسخه‌های متأثر
<= 0.23.34
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
0.23.35
نسخه‌های متأثر
>= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
1.0.0-M47
نسخه‌های متأثر
>= 1.0.0-M1, <= 1.0.0-M46
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
1.0.0-M47
نسخه‌های متأثر
<= 0.23.34
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
0.23.35

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-69205

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.48%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۸

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Summary

Ember's HTTP/1.1 header parser matches the Transfer-Encoding header value with a case-sensitive substring test (hValue.contains("chunked")). RFC 9112 §7 requires transfer-coding names to be compared case-insensitively. A request carrying Transfer-Encoding: Chunked (capital C) is therefore not recognised as chunked, and Ember falls back to framing by Content-Length (or zero if absent) while a compliant intermediary frames the same bytes by chunked encoding. The two parsers then disagree on where the request body ends, enabling HTTP request smuggling (TE.CL / TE.0).

The same line of code admits two further variants:

  • The substring test misfires on Transfer-Encoding: notchunked (an inverse desync — Ember treats it as chunked while a compliant intermediary rejects the unknown coding).

  • Header field bytes are decoded with the platform-default charset. Under UTF-8 the wire bytes E2 84 AA decode to U+212A KELVIN SIGN, which String.equalsIgnoreCase Unicode-case-folds to k, so Transfer-Encoding: chun<U+212A>ed matches chunked once the comparison is made case-insensitive without also pinning the decode to ISO-8859-1.

Impact

Server

Request smuggling when ember-server is an origin behind an intermediary that honours Transfer-Encoding case-insensitively per RFC, forwards the header value verbatim, and reuses keep-alive connections to the backend:

  • Front-end security bypass: the smuggled request reaches paths the intermediary's ACL/auth layer would have blocked, with attacker-chosen method and headers.

  • Cross-user request hijack: a partial smuggled prefix left in Ember's connection buffer is concatenated with the next victim's request on the same pooled backend connection, exposing its headers (e.g. Cookie, Authorization) to the attacker.

  • Cache poisoning: the smuggled response is associated with the next request key in a caching proxy.

Client

ember-client shares the same HeaderP.parse on the response path, enabling response smuggling when http4s is used as a gateway. This is less severe: it requires a malicious or compromised upstream rather than an anonymous remote client.

Preconditions

  • Unauthenticated remote attacker (server)

  • ember-server as origin behind a keep-alive intermediary

  • Intermediary treats Transfer-Encoding case-insensitively (per RFC) and forwards the header value without lowercasing it

  • Malicious or compromised upstream (client)

Workarounds

  • Intermediary fully buffers and re-encodes request bodies (e.g. nginx with default proxy_request_buffering on)

  • Intermediary normalises the Transfer-Encoding value (lowercases the token) before forwarding

  • Disable backend keep-alive between the intermediary and Ember

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • ERobertGII
  • rossabaker