نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 8.36
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 8.37.0
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
Marten's full-text search APIs interpolated the user-supplied regConfig parameter directly into the generated SQL without parameterization or validation, making every code path that exposes regConfig to untrusted input a SQL injection sink.
Affected APIs
IQuerySession.SearchAsync<T>(string searchTerm, string regConfig, ...)IQuerySession.PlainTextSearchAsync<T>(...)IQuerySession.PhraseSearchAsync<T>(...)IQuerySession.WebStyleSearchAsync<T>(...)IQuerySession.PrefixSearchAsync<T>(...)IQueryable<T>.Where(x => x.Search(term, regConfig))and the matchingPlainTextSearch/PhraseSearch/WebStyleSearch/PrefixSearchextension methods
Details
In the affected versions, FullTextWhereFragment renders the WHERE-clause SQL by string interpolation:
private string Sql =>
$"to_tsvector('{_regConfig}'::regconfig, {_dataConfig}) @@ {_searchFunction}('{_regConfig}'::regconfig, ?)";
_regConfig arrives unchanged from the public API surface above. Any value containing a single quote terminates the SQL literal and lets an attacker append arbitrary PostgreSQL.
Confirmed exploit shapes (with regConfig set to attacker-controlled input)
| Goal | Payload |
|---|---|
| Time-based blind | english'::text); SELECT pg_sleep(5); -- |
| Information disclosure | english'; SELECT version(); -- |
| DDL execution | english'; DROP TABLE mt_doc_article; -- |
All five overloads listed above produced SQL containing the verbatim payload.
Impact
Confidentiality: an attacker can append arbitrary
SELECTstatements and exfiltrate database contents through error channels, response timing, or — if the application surfaces query results — directly.Integrity / Availability: DDL,
UPDATE,DELETE, andpg_sleep-style denial-of-service payloads succeed under the same vector. Concrete impact depends on the database role used by the Marten connection string.Precondition: the calling application must forward attacker-controlled input into the
regConfigparameter (e.g. a?lang=query string mapped toregConfig). Applications that hard-coderegConfigto a compile-time constant are not exploitable.
Patches
Fixed in Marten 8.36.1 (and forward) by #4343.
FullTextWhereFragment now validates regConfig against ^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$ (a simple PostgreSQL identifier, optionally schema-qualified, capped at NAMEDATALEN-1 per side) and throws ArgumentException for anything else. The default value ("english"), schema-qualified configs ("pg_catalog.english"), and the standard PostgreSQL text-search configurations all continue to work.
Workarounds
If users cannot upgrade immediately, do one of the following at the application boundary:
Hard-code
regConfigto a compile-time constant ("english","simple", …) and never accept it from request input.Validate any externally-sourced
regConfigvalue before passing it to Marten — e.g. against the same regex as the patch (^[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*(\.[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*)?$) or against an allowlist of PostgreSQL configurations the application actually uses.Drop the
regConfigargument from the call site so Marten falls back to the safe default.
Resources
Patch PR: JasperFx/marten#4343
Patched file:
FullTextWhereFragment.csRegression tests:
full_text_regconfig_sql_injection.cs
Credit
Reported privately to the JasperFx team with a working proof of concept covering all five affected overloads.
پیوندها
- https://github.com/JasperFx/marten
- https://github.com/JasperFx/marten/commit/626249656829860b9c55895b5b6046b61a2a695f
- https://github.com/JasperFx/marten/pull/4343
- https://github.com/JasperFx/marten/security/advisories/GHSA-vmw2-qwm8-x84c
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vmw2-qwm8-x84c
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45288

