همهٔ گزارش‌ها
متوسط

Steeltoe's static JWKS cache shared across schemes and never invalidated

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

نسخه‌های متأثر
<= 3.3.0
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
3.4.0
نسخه‌های متأثر
<= 4.1.0
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
4.2.0
نسخه‌های متأثر
<= 4.1.0
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
4.2.0

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-50202

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.29%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۷

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Summary

The JWT signing key cache in TokenKeyResolver uses kid as the sole cache key without namespacing by authority. In applications with multiple JwtBearer schemes pointing to different identity providers, a key fetched for one scheme can satisfy token validation for another. Additionally, cached keys have no expiration, so rotated or revoked keys remain trusted until the application process restarts.

Impact

In multi-scheme deployments, an attacker who controls one identity provider's signing key can forge tokens accepted by other schemes within the same application. For all applications using TokenKeyResolver, a signing key removed from the identity provider's JWKS endpoint remains trusted indefinitely.

Mitigations

If an immediate upgrade is not possible:

  • In multi-scheme deployments, configure only one JwtBearer scheme per application when different identity providers are required.

  • Restart the application process after an identity provider signing key rotation to clear stale cached keys.

پیوندها