نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- >=0.0.0-0 <0.44.6 || >=0.45.0-alpha.1 <0.45.0-alpha.6
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.44.6 · 0.45.0-alpha.6
شرح آسیبپذیری
The nostr crate did not validate the length of the initialization vector
decoded from the ?iv= portion of a NIP-04 encrypted message.
The decoded IV was converted from a byte slice to the 16-byte AES-CBC IV type
using a conversion that asserts the slice length. As a result, an IV whose
decoded length was not exactly 16 bytes caused a panic before ciphertext
decryption. For example, ?iv=AAAA decodes to a three-byte IV and triggers the
panic.
Applications that decrypt untrusted NIP-04 content are affected. The issue is also reachable through NIP-47 (Nostr Wallet Connect), where response and notification events from a malicious or compromised wallet service are passed to NIP-04 decryption. If the panic is not isolated, a crafted event can terminate the application or disrupt message processing, causing a denial of service.
The issue does not affect confidentiality or integrity.
The flaw was corrected by converting the decoded IV to [u8; 16] using a
checked conversion. Invalid IV lengths now return a Malformed error instead of
panicking.
Credit
Discovered and responsibly disclosed by Muhammed Shekho (mhd-shekho.com).

