An unauthenticated remote attacker connecting with the CORE protocol can discover cluster node details by sending a SUBSCRIBE_TOPOLOGY request prior to authentication.
This issue affects Apache Artemis: from 2.50.0 through 2.56.0; Apache ActiveMQ Artemis: from 1.0.0 through 2.44.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 2.57.0, which fixes the issue.
A missing authentication vulnerability was found in Apache ActiveMQ Artemis. The SUBSCRIBE_TOPOLOGY_V2 handler in CoreProtocolManager.LocalChannelHandler.handlePacket() processes topology subscription requests on channel0 with zero authentication -- no call to getSecurityStore(), no credential verification, no subject validation. An unauthenticated attacker can send a single 5-byte packet on the CORE protocol (via :8080 HTTP-upgrade in EAP or :61616 in AMQ Broker) to obtain the broker's nodeID (type-1 UUID embedding MAC address), internal hostname/IP, port numbers, connector configurations, and backup/scale-down group names. In clustered deployments, a persistent ClusterTopologyListener is registered that continuously pushes all topology changes to the unauthenticated client. This contrasts with the federation handler in the same file which was fixed via ARTEMIS-5928 (CVE-2026-27446). The leaked nodeID UUID seed directly enables session-name brute-force for REATTACH_SESSION session hijack.