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kernel: futex/pi: Reject cross-mm private futex owners

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بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-80778

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.17%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۶

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: futex/pi: Reject cross-mm private futex owners A private futex key borrows the waiter's mm without taking an mm_users reference. Nevertheless, attach_to_pi_owner() currently accepts an owner from a different address space and copies the private key into the owner's PI state. When that owner exits, exit_pi_state_list() uses the saved key to find the hash bucket and acquires a reference to the waiter's private hash. If the last user of the waiter's mm exits concurrently, futex_hash_free() frees the hash while the owner still uses its bucket and reference. Prevent this by validating in attach_to_pi_owner() that, for private futexes, the owner mm and waiter mm are the same. Perform the check with the owner's pi_lock held and after validating owner::futex::state to serialize against a concurrent PI-state exit cleanup. [ tglx: Amended comment ]

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel. A race condition exists in the futex/pi (Fast Userspace Mutexes / Priority Inheritance) subsystem. When a private futex key borrows a waiter's memory management (mm) structure without proper referencing, the attach_to_pi_owner() function can accept an owner from a different address space. This can lead to a situation where the futex hash is freed while still being used by an owner, potentially causing a use-after-free vulnerability. A local attacker could exploit this to cause a denial of service or system instability.