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bouncycastle: Bouncy Castle for Java: Private key recovery via timing side-channel in ML-KEM (CRYSTALS-Kyber) routines

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بهره‌برداری

CVE-2024-14041

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.46%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۸

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

In Bouncy Castle for Java from 1.73 to before 1.78, three ML-KEM (CRYSTALS-Kyber) routines divided secret-derived polynomial coefficients by the modulus q: Poly.toMsg, which decodes the decrypted message, and the ciphertext compression routines Poly.compressPoly and PolyVec.compressPolyVec. An attacker able to measure the timing of a large number of decapsulations performed with the same long-term private key can recover that key. These are the KyberSlash1 (Poly.toMsg) and KyberSlash2 (ciphertext compression) divisions. Compression performed during encapsulation operates on values that become the public ciphertext and is not affected.

A flaw was found in Bouncy Castle for Java, affecting ML-KEM (CRYSTALS-Kyber) routines. Specifically, the Poly.toMsg, Poly.compressPoly, and PolyVec.compressPolyVec routines, which handle secret-derived polynomial coefficients, perform division by the modulus q. A remote attacker can exploit this timing side-channel vulnerability by measuring the time taken for a large number of decapsulations using the same long-term private key. Successful exploitation allows the attacker to recover the long-term private key, leading to a significant compromise of cryptographic security.