همهٔ گزارش‌ها
زیاد

kernel: drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

نسخه‌های متأثر
نامشخص
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
اعلام نشده
نسخه‌های متأثر
نامشخص
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
اعلام نشده

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-64219

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.17%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۸

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async [Why&How] dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async() copies payload->length bytes into a 16-byte stack buffer (dpaux.data[16]) guarded only by an ASSERT(), which is a no-op in release builds. If a caller ever passes length > 16 this results in a stack buffer overflow via memcpy. Additionally, link_index is used to dereference dc->links[] without bounds checking against dc->link_count, risking an out-of-bounds access. Replace the ASSERT with a hard runtime check that returns false when payload->length exceeds the destination buffer size, and add a bounds check for link_index before it is used. (cherry picked from commit ba4caa9fecdf7a38f98c878ad05a8a64148b6881)

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's AMD display driver. A local attacker can exploit insufficient input validation during auxiliary data transfers to cause a stack buffer overflow and out-of-bounds memory access. This vulnerability allows the attacker to corrupt kernel memory, which may lead to privilege escalation or a Denial of Service (DoS) through a system crash.