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pympp allows excessive sponsored transaction fees through padded calldata

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

PyPIpympp
نسخه‌های متأثر
< 0.9.1
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
0.9.1

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-63634

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.29%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۶

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Details

When the server acts as the fee_payer, pympp 0.8.0 validates calldata using eth_abi decoding, which is lenient about trailing bytes. The FeePayerPolicy caps gas_limit (≤ 2 M) and max_fee_per_gas (≤ 100 Gwei) but does not check calldata length.

Tempo uses legacy calldata gas pricing: 16 gas per non-zero byte. Appending N bytes of 0x01 padding inflates actual gas used by N × 16 while keeping gas_limit and max_fee_per_gas within policy caps. The server cosigns and broadcasts the padded transaction, draining its fee-payer wallet.

Vulnerable code path: FeePayerPolicy in fee_payer_policy.py (pympp 0.8.0) enforces maxGas = 2_000_000 and maxFeePerGas = 100 Gwei but has no calldata.length bound. The policy check passes because the inflated gas comes from intrinsic calldata cost, not the declared gas_limit.

Note: In our experiment, we enforce an 16 KB max_header_length, which caps the maximum effective padding at roughly 5,500 bytes. The default padding in this PoC (5,500 bytes) is within that limit.

PoC

The PoC is provided below. It is configured to reproduce the attack on Tempo Moderate testnet within a Docker environment. Download the PoC and run:

unzip pympp_python_PoC.zip
cd pympp_python
docker build -t pympp-padding .
docker run --rm pympp-padding

There are more details in pympp_python/README.md

Impact

In our experiment, a malicious client can force the server to pay ~5x the normal transaction fee. This dramatically increases operational costs and completely destroys the profit margin on low-cost items.

Please provide a way to share the PoC in .zip format to you. Thank you!

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • kai-kka