همهٔ گزارش‌ها
نامشخص

Unsigned NSEC or NSEC3 record used in a nonexistence proof (hickory-proto)

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

Rust / Cargohickory-net
نسخه‌های متأثر
>=0.0.0-0 <0.26.2
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
0.26.2
Rust / Cargohickory-proto
نسخه‌های متأثر
>=0.0.0-0 <0.26.0-beta.1
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
0.26.0-beta.1

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Up to 0.26.0-alpha.1, hickory-proto's DNSSEC validation kept an NSEC or NSEC3 record for a nonexistence proof if any authority record with the same owner name had validated, not only if that record itself had. Someone who can answer or modify DNS responses could pair a correctly signed record with a forged NSEC or NSEC3 record of the same owner name and get a forged denial accepted as secure.

From 0.26.0-beta.1 the DNSSEC validation code lives in the hickory-net crate, where this was fixed in hickory-net 0.26.2. No hickory-proto release contains a fix. Users of DNSSEC validation in older hickory-proto releases (directly or through hickory-resolver or hickory-recursor) should move to the 0.26.2 or later releases, which validate through hickory-net.

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