All reports
High

Envoy has RBAC Header Validation Bypass via Multi-Value Header Concatenation

Affected versions

Affected versions
<= 1.34.12
Fixed version
1.34.13
Affected versions
= 1.37.0
Fixed version
1.37.1
Affected versions
>= 1.35.0, <= 1.35.8
Fixed version
1.35.9
Affected versions
>= 1.36.0, <= 1.36.4
Fixed version
1.36.5

Exploitation

CVE-2026-26308

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.32%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-19

Description

1. Summary

The Envoy RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) filter contains a logic vulnerability in how it validates HTTP headers when multiple values are present for the same header name. Instead of validating each header value individually, Envoy concatenates all values into a single comma-separated string. This behavior allows attackers to bypass RBAC policies—specifically "Deny" rules—by sending duplicate headers, effectively obscuring the malicious value from exact-match mechanisms.

2. Attack Scenario

Consider an environment where an administrator wants to block external access to internal resources using a specific header flag.

Configuration

The Envoy proxy is configured with a Deny rule to reject requests containing the header internal: true.

  • Rule Type: Exact Match

  • Target: internal header must not equal true.

The Bypass Logic
  1. Standard Request (Blocked):

    • Input: internal: true

    • Envoy Processing: Sees string "true".

    • Result: Match found. Request Denied.

  2. Exploit Request (Bypassed):

    • Input:

      internal: true
      internal: true
      
    • Envoy Processing: Concatenates values into "true,true".

    • Matcher Evaluation: Does "true,true" equal "true"? No.

    • Result: The Deny rule fails to trigger. Request Allowed.

3. Implications

  • RBAC Bypass: Remote attackers can bypass configured access controls.

  • Unauthorized Access: Sensitive internal resources or administrative endpoints protected by header-based Deny rules become accessible.

  • Risk: High, particularly for deployments relying on "Exact Match" strategies for security blocking.

4. Reproduction Steps

To verify this vulnerability:

  1. Deploy Envoy: Configure an instance with an RBAC Deny rule that performs an exact match on a specific header (e.g., internal: true).

  2. Baseline Test: Send a request containing the header internal: true.

    • Observation: Envoy blocks this request (HTTP 403).

  3. Exploit Test: Send a second request containing the same header twice:

    GET /restricted-resource HTTP/1.1
    Host: example.com
    internal: true
    internal: true
    
    • Observation: Envoy allows the request, granting access to the resource.

6. Recommendations

Fix Header Validation Logic: Modify the RBAC filter to validate each header value instance individually. Avoid relying on the concatenated string output of getAllOfHeaderAsString() for security-critical matching unless the matcher is explicitly designed to parse comma-separated lists.

** Examine the DENY role to use a Regex style fix.

Credit: Dor Konis

Links

Credits

  • botengyao
  • phlax
  • agrawroh
  • sekveaja