نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 1.34.12
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.34.13
- نسخههای متأثر
- = 1.37.0
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.37.1
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 1.35.0, <= 1.35.8
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.35.9
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 1.36.0, <= 1.36.4
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.36.5
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
1. Summary
The Envoy RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) filter contains a logic vulnerability in how it validates HTTP headers when multiple values are present for the same header name. Instead of validating each header value individually, Envoy concatenates all values into a single comma-separated string. This behavior allows attackers to bypass RBAC policies—specifically "Deny" rules—by sending duplicate headers, effectively obscuring the malicious value from exact-match mechanisms.
2. Attack Scenario
Consider an environment where an administrator wants to block external access to internal resources using a specific header flag.
Configuration
The Envoy proxy is configured with a Deny rule to reject requests containing the header internal: true.
Rule Type: Exact Match
Target:
internalheader must not equaltrue.
The Bypass Logic
-
Standard Request (Blocked):
Input:
internal: trueEnvoy Processing: Sees string
"true".Result: Match found. Request Denied.
-
Exploit Request (Bypassed):
Input:
internal: true internal: trueEnvoy Processing: Concatenates values into
"true,true".Matcher Evaluation: Does
"true,true"equal"true"? No.Result: The Deny rule fails to trigger. Request Allowed.
3. Implications
RBAC Bypass: Remote attackers can bypass configured access controls.
Unauthorized Access: Sensitive internal resources or administrative endpoints protected by header-based Deny rules become accessible.
Risk: High, particularly for deployments relying on "Exact Match" strategies for security blocking.
4. Reproduction Steps
To verify this vulnerability:
Deploy Envoy: Configure an instance with an RBAC Deny rule that performs an exact match on a specific header (e.g.,
internal: true).Baseline Test: Send a request containing the header
internal: true.Observation: Envoy blocks this request (HTTP 403).
Exploit Test: Send a second request containing the same header twice:
GET /restricted-resource HTTP/1.1 Host: example.com internal: true internal: trueObservation: Envoy allows the request, granting access to the resource.
6. Recommendations
Fix Header Validation Logic:
Modify the RBAC filter to validate each header value instance individually. Avoid relying on the concatenated string output of getAllOfHeaderAsString() for security-critical matching unless the matcher is explicitly designed to parse comma-separated lists.
** Examine the DENY role to use a Regex style fix.
Credit: Dor Konis
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- botengyao
- phlax
- agrawroh
- sekveaja

