All reports
Critical

Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass

Affected versions

Affected versions
>= 2.2.0, < 2.2.8
Fixed version
2.2.8
Affected versions
< 2.0.29
Fixed version
2.0.29
Affected versions
>= 2.1.0, < 2.1.13
Fixed version
2.1.13
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported
Affected versions
Unknown
Fixed version
Not reported

Exploitation

CVE-2026-47065

Probability of exploitation in the next 30 days: 0.50%

FIRST EPSS · 2026-11-21

Description

ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy

Assessment: Fully addressed.

When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list .

ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes

Assessment: Fully addressed.

For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers

Both issues have been fixed.

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