نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 2.2.0, < 2.2.8
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 2.2.8
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 2.0.29
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 2.0.29
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 2.1.0, < 2.1.13
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 2.1.13
- نسخههای متأثر
- نامشخص
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- اعلام نشده
- نسخههای متأثر
- نامشخص
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- اعلام نشده
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy
Assessment: Fully addressed.
When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list .
ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes
Assessment: Fully addressed.
For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers
Both issues have been fixed.

