نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 1.6.0-alpha.0, < 1.6.0-beta.4
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.6.0-beta.4
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 1.5.0, < 1.5.5
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.5.5
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 1.4.5
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.4.5
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
The jsexprToSQL() function in Saltcorn converts JavaScript expressions to SQL for use in database constraints. The Literal handler wraps string values in single quotes without escaping embedded single quotes, allowing SQL injection when creating Formula-type table constraints.
Vulnerable Component
File: packages/saltcorn-data/models/expression.ts, lines 117-118
Literal({ value }: { value: ExtendedNode }) {
if (typeof value == "string") return `'${value}'`; // NO ESCAPING!
return `${value}`;
},
Call chain: Formula constraint creation → table_constraints.ts:127 → jsexprToSQL() → Literal() → db.query() executes unsanitized SQL.
Proof of Concept
Injection via Formula Constraint
When an admin creates a Formula-type table constraint with the expression:
name === "test' OR '1'='1"
The jsexprToSQL() function generates:
(name)=('test' OR '1'='1')
This is then executed as:
ALTER TABLE "tablename" ADD CONSTRAINT "tablename_fml_1" CHECK ((name)=('test' OR '1'='1'));
The single quote in the string literal is not escaped, breaking out of the SQL string context.
More Dangerous Payload
name === "'; DROP TABLE users; --"
Generates:
(name)=(''; DROP TABLE users; --')
Verified on Saltcorn v1.5.0 (Docker)
Direct invocation of jsexprToSQL() inside the running container confirms the vulnerability:
Input: name === "hello"
Output: (name)=('hello') ← Normal
Input: name === "test' OR '1'='1"
Output: (name)=('test' OR '1'='1') ← Single quote NOT escaped, OR injected
Input: name === "'; DROP TABLE users; --"
Output: (name)=(''; DROP TABLE users; --') ← DROP TABLE injected
The test was performed on a completely fresh Saltcorn installation (zero user-created tables, default Docker setup).
PoC Screenshot
Create a table after moving to the table menu
Go to the table and then to
Constraits
Go to
Formula
Create a test table for verification
Input the payload and save
Check the table for testing
Impact
Arbitrary SQL execution via crafted CHECK constraints
Data exfiltration through error-based or time-based SQL injection
Database schema manipulation (DROP TABLE, ALTER TABLE)
Potential privilege escalation via direct
userstable modification
Suggested Remediation
Escape single quotes in the Literal handler:
Literal({ value }: { value: ExtendedNode }) {
if (typeof value == "string") return `'${value.replace(/'/g, "''")}'`;
return `${value}`;
},
Alternatively, use parameterized queries for constraint creation instead of string interpolation.
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- zulloper

