نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 1.6.0-alpha.0, < 1.6.0-beta.2
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.6.0-beta.2
- نسخههای متأثر
- < 1.4.4
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.4.4
- نسخههای متأثر
- >= 1.5.0-beta.0, < 1.5.2
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 1.5.2
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
When a tenant admin is logged out of the root domain (e.g., saltcorn.com) but logged in to their own tenant space as admin, they can simply append /tenant/create to their tenant URL. The system reads the role from the tenant context (admin), and a new tenant is created on the root domain (in PUBLIC SCHEMA > _sc_tenants), rather than in the tenant's own _sc_tenants table.
If the same logic applies to other routes, a tenant admin effectively gains admin rights on the root domain.
PoC
A tenant-created subtenant appears under the Saltcorn public schema instead of the tenant's own schema.
Even when
role_id=1is required for tenant creation on saltcorn.com (only admin can create tenants), existing tenant admins can still create new tenants because their localrole_id:1is evaluated against the root domain.Even when
role_to_create_tenantis set to0in the tenant's_sc_configschema, or removed entirely, the tenant admin can still create sub-tenants on the root domain — suggestingrole_to_create_tenantis not being read at all.
Impact
Tenant admins gain unauthorized admin-level access to the root domain. Any authenticated tenant admin can perform privileged operations (e.g., creating tenants) on the root domain by exploiting the role context mismatch.
پیوندها
گزارشدهندگان
- j2l

