نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 0.4.80
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.5.2
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
9router treats local loopback requests as trusted and allows access to /v1/* without an
API key. In a documented/common reverse-proxy deployment where nginx forwards public
traffic to the backend via 127.0.0.1, external non-Origin requests are misclassified as
local. This allows unauthenticated access to /v1 APIs such as /v1/models, and may allow
abuse of configured upstream provider credentials depending on the enabled providers.
Details
Affected version / commit: 9router
v0.4.80@b282f05.Deployment precondition: a same-host reverse proxy (e.g. nginx) forwarding public traffic to the backend on
127.0.0.1/localhost. This mirrors the documented cloud deployment (proxy_pass http://localhost:20128withX-Real-IP/X-Forwarded-For).Observed behaviour:
The direct backend (
direct-backend, port18081) returns401for/v1/modelswithout an API key.A direct request that spoofs
X-9r-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1still returns401: the custom server deletes the client-supplied header and overwrites it with the real socket address, so naive header spoofing does not work against the direct backend.The proxied path (
reverse-proxy, port18080) returns200with the full model catalog for the same/v1/modelsrequest without any API key.A proxied request that carries an
Originheader returns401. The bypass therefore primarily affects curl / SDK / server-side / non-browser clients, which do not sendOrigin.
Root cause: the backend's local/remote decision relies on perceived socket/loopback locality after reverse proxying. Because nginx connects to the backend from
127.0.0.1, the backend stamps a loopback client address for every internet client and treats the request as local, skipping the/v1API-key requirement. The forwardedX-Real-IP/X-Forwarded-Forheaders that carry the true client IP are ignored for this decision.This is not a simple client header-spoofing issue (the direct-spoof control above proves header spoofing is rejected); it is a property of how loopback proxy traffic is trusted.
Proof of Concept
This repository is a self-contained Docker Compose reproduction. No real provider is called and no real API key is required.
Build and start the stack:
docker compose up --buildDirect baseline (no API key):
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:18081/v1/modelsDirect spoof control:
curl -i -H "X-9r-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1" http://127.0.0.1:18081/v1/modelsReverse-proxy bypass (no API key):
curl -i http://127.0.0.1:18080/v1/modelsReverse-proxy
Origincontrol:curl -i -H "Origin: http://evil.example" http://127.0.0.1:18080/v1/models
Expected evidence
| Request | Result |
|---|---|
Direct 18081, no key |
401 Unauthorized ({"error":"API key required for remote API access"}) |
Direct 18081, X-9r-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1 spoof |
401 Unauthorized |
Proxied 18080, no key |
200 OK with the full model catalog |
Proxied 18080, with Origin |
401 Unauthorized |
Impact
Unauthenticated access to the
/v1API surface in the affected reverse-proxy deployment.Model enumeration via
/v1/models.Possible abuse of the operator's configured upstream provider credentials through
/v1/chat/completionsand other/v1proxy endpoints (the attacker spends the operator's provider quota/keys without holding any key of their own).Actual impact depends on which providers are configured and how the instance is exposed to the public internet.
The attacker requires no API key.
Suggested Fix
Do not use client/proxy/socket IP locality as an authentication bypass.
Require an API key by default for
/v1/*on public listeners.If local trust is genuinely needed, bind it to an unguessable server-generated secret or to a Unix domain socket that is only accessible locally — not to "the connection looks like loopback".
When running behind reverse proxies, use an explicit trusted-proxy configuration and a real client-IP derivation (e.g. a vetted
X-Forwarded-Forchain), and never treat all loopback proxy traffic as end-user-local.Document a secure reverse-proxy configuration for operators.
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x5c9-v98j-722r
- https://github.com/decolua/9router
- https://github.com/decolua/9router/commit/da667836cc7584bea0edd893de1d590c9ea279dc
- https://github.com/decolua/9router/releases/tag/v0.5.2
- https://github.com/decolua/9router/security/advisories/GHSA-x5c9-v98j-722r
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56675
گزارشدهندگان
- dinhvaren

