نسخههای متأثر
- نسخههای متأثر
- <= 0.4.80
- نسخهٔ اصلاحشده
- 0.5.2
بهرهبرداری
شرح آسیبپذیری
Summary
9router validates image URLs by resolving the host before fetching, but the later server-side fetch performs a separate DNS resolution. An attacker-controlled DNS name can resolve to a public IP during validation and then rebind to an internal Docker/private IP during the fetch. This allows the server-side image prefetch to reach internal-only HTTP services (SSRF).
Details
Affected version / commit: 9router
v0.4.80@b282f05.Reachable through
/v1/chat/completionswith a vision-capable model and animage_urlcontent part. A vision-capable model name is required so the image survives modality stripping and the server-side prefetch is armed.The provider used in this reproduction is the bundled mock provider — no real API key and no real provider call.
internal-admin (the SSRF target) is not exposed to the host network; it is reachable only from inside the Docker network.
rebind-dns behaviour for
rebind.9r.test:first A response →
1.1.1.1(public) to pass the public-host guard,second A response →
172.29.0.10(internal-admin) during the fetch.
internal-admin logs
GET /ssrf-markerwithpeer=172.29.0.30(theproxied-routercontainer), proving the server-side fetch landed on the internal service.mock-provider receives
POST /api/chatand the flow completes withHTTP 200.Root cause: DNS TOCTOU — the IP is not pinned between the validation resolution (the public-host guard) and the fetch resolution. The guard and the fetch each resolve the hostname independently, so a TTL-0 rebinding authority can return a public IP to the guard and an internal IP to the fetch.
Proof of Concept
This repository is a self-contained Docker Compose reproduction. No real provider is called and no real API key is required.
Build and start the stack:
docker compose up --buildConfirm
internal-adminis unreachable from the host:curl -i http://127.0.0.1:18083/ssrf-marker # connection refused / fail docker compose ps # internal-admin has NO host port mappingSend the request named
POST image-prefetch DNS rebinding triggerfromrequests.http, or with curl:curl -i -X POST http://127.0.0.1:18082/v1/chat/completions \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "model": "ollama-local/gemma3", "messages": [{"role":"user","content":[ {"type":"text","text":"reproduction image-prefetch trigger"}, {"type":"image_url","image_url":{"url":"http://rebind.9r.test:8080/ssrf-marker?case=rebind-trigger"}} ]}], "stream": false }'
Impact
SSRF to internal HTTP services reachable from the 9router host/container.
Depending on the environment, this can reach cloud metadata endpoints, internal admin panels, or be used for internal service discovery.
Blind / semi-blind SSRF when the fetched response is not returned to the attacker; an exfil variant (pointing the image at an internal endpoint that returns valid image bytes) can return internal content base64-encoded to the upstream.
Requires a code path that prefetches/normalizes remote images for vision-capable providers.
No real credential is needed for the reproduction.
Suggested Fix
Pin the resolved IP after validation and connect to that IP (resolve once, then reuse the address for the fetch).
Block private, loopback, link-local, multicast, and cloud-metadata ranges at connect time, not only at validation time.
Perform DNS resolution and IP checks immediately before the request and against the address actually used to connect.
Disable redirects, or re-validate every redirect target with the same checks.
Enforce an allowlist for image-fetch domains where feasible.
Add a timeout, a response size limit, and a content-type check.
پیوندها
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cmhj-wh2f-9cgx
- https://github.com/decolua/9router
- https://github.com/decolua/9router/commit/c7d07448c58bec1200741de0b73305b860416b82
- https://github.com/decolua/9router/releases/tag/v0.5.2
- https://github.com/decolua/9router/security/advisories/GHSA-cmhj-wh2f-9cgx
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56676
گزارشدهندگان
- dinhvaren

