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kernel: ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl()

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بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-31415

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.12%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۷

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: avoid overflows in ip6_datagram_send_ctl() Yiming Qian reported : I believe I found a locally triggerable kernel bug in the IPv6 sendmsg ancillary-data path that can panic the kernel via skb_under_panic() (local DoS). The core issue is a mismatch between:

  • a 16-bit length accumulator (struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen, type __u16) and

  • a pointer to the last provided destination-options header (opt->dst1opt) when multiple IPV6_DSTOPTS control messages (cmsgs) are provided.

  • include/net/ipv6.h:

  • struct ipv6_txoptions::opt_flen is __u16 (wrap possible). (lines 291-307, especially 298)

  • net/ipv6/datagram.c:ip6_datagram_send_ctl():

  • Accepts repeated IPV6_DSTOPTS and accumulates into opt_flen without rejecting duplicates. (lines 909-933)

  • net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_append_data():

  • Uses opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen to compute header sizes/headroom decisions. (lines 1448-1466, especially 1463-1465)

  • net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:__ip6_make_skb():

  • Calls ipv6_push_frag_opts() if opt->opt_flen is non-zero. (lines 1930-1934)

  • net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:ipv6_push_frag_opts() / ipv6_push_exthdr():

  • Push size comes from ipv6_optlen(opt->dst1opt) (based on the pointed-to header). (lines 1179-1185 and 1206-1211)

  1. opt_flen is a 16-bit accumulator:

  • include/net/ipv6.h:298 defines __u16 opt_flen; /* after fragment hdr */.

  1. ip6_datagram_send_ctl() accepts repeated IPV6_DSTOPTS cmsgs and increments opt_flen each time:

  • In net/ipv6/datagram.c:909-933, for IPV6_DSTOPTS:

  • It computes len = ((hdr->hdrlen + 1) << 3);

  • It checks CAP_NET_RAW using ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW). (line 922)

  • Then it does:

  • opt->opt_flen += len; (line 927)

  • opt->dst1opt = hdr; (line 928) There is no duplicate rejection here (unlike the legacy IPV6_2292DSTOPTS path which rejects duplicates at net/ipv6/datagram.c:901-904). If enough large IPV6_DSTOPTS cmsgs are provided, opt_flen wraps while dst1opt still points to a large (2048-byte) destination-options header. In the attached PoC (poc.c):

  • 32 cmsgs with hdrlen=255 => len = (255+1)*8 = 2048

  • 1 cmsg with hdrlen=0 => len = 8

  • Total increment: 32*2048 + 8 = 65544, so (__u16)opt_flen == 8

  • The last cmsg is 2048 bytes, so dst1opt points to a 2048-byte header.

  1. The transmit path sizes headers using the wrapped opt_flen:

  • In net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1463-1465:

  • headersize = sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + (opt ? opt->opt_flen + opt->opt_nflen : 0) + ...; With wrapped opt_flen, headersize/headroom decisions underestimate what will be pushed later.

  1. When building the final skb, the actual push length comes from dst1opt and is not limited by wrapped opt_flen:

  • In net/ipv6/ip6_output.c:1930-1934:

  • if (opt->opt_flen) proto = ipv6_push_frag_opts(skb, opt, proto);

  • In net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1206-1211, ipv6_push_frag_opts() pushes dst1opt via ipv6_push_exthdr().

  • In net/ipv6/exthdrs.c:1179-1184, ipv6_push_exthdr() does:

  • skb_push(skb, ipv6_optlen(opt));

  • memcpy(h, opt, ipv6_optlen(opt)); With insufficient headroom, skb_push() underflows and triggers skb_under_panic() -> BUG():

  • net/core/skbuff.c:2669-2675 (skb_push() calls skb_under_panic())

  • net/core/skbuff.c:207-214 (skb_panic() ends in BUG())

  • The IPV6_DSTOPTS cmsg path requires CAP_NET_RAW in the target netns user namespace (ns_capable(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_RAW)).

  • Root (or any task with CAP_NET_RAW) can trigger this without user namespaces.

  • An unprivileged uid=1000 user can trigger this if unprivileged user namespaces are enabled and it can create a userns+netns to obtain namespaced CAP_NET_RAW (the attached PoC does this).

  • Local denial of service: kernel BUG/panic (system crash).

---truncated---

A flaw was found in the Linux kernel. A local attacker can exploit an integer overflow vulnerability in the ip6_datagram_send_ctl() function when processing multiple IPv6 Destination Options (DSTOPTS) control messages. This issue causes an incorrect calculation of header sizes, leading to a buffer underflow during packet construction. Successful exploitation can result in a kernel panic, causing a denial of service.